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Pursuant to congressional mandate, the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission (NBRC) has reported its recommendations for
modification to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended
(the "Bankruptcy Code"), to the President, Congress, and Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on October 20, 1997. This Article fo-
cuses on the proposed revisions relating to taxation of individual
debtor estates, tax return filing requirements, and the priority and
dischargeability of tax claims.
Under the auspices of the NBRC, the Tax Advisory Committee
(the "Advisory Committee") was formed in February 1997. The
members of the Advisory Committee were appointed by the NBRC
and include representatives from the private bar, federal and state
governments, and academia. 2
The NBRC directed that the Advisory Committee deliver a fi-
nal report by the August 1997 meeting in Washington, D.C. The
NBRC further requested that the Advisory Committee prepare Pre-
liminary Reports for the April 1997 meeting in Seattle, Washington,
and the June 1997 meeting in Detroit, Michigan. The Preliminary
Reports identified those areas of bankruptcy taxation that the Advi-
sory Committee had determined were susceptible to agreement
among its members and those proposals that had been withdrawn
from consideration by the Advisory Committee as unimportant, un-
clear, or considered elsewhere. The Advisory Committee continued
the process of discussing and identifying those proposals that may
be susceptible to agreement. The Final Report contains three sec-
I11 U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq. (1994).
2 The Advisory Committee members were Paul Asofsky, Mark Browning, Steve Csontos,
Robert MacKenzie, Robert Miller, Grant Newton, Joan Pilver, Mark Seigel, and Ken Well. I
chaired the Advisory Committee. The NBRC's charge to the Advisory Committee was broad,
including the jurisdiction to propose and discuss all issues related to federal, state, and local
tax collection, compliance, and reporting related to bankruptcy, the bankruptcy process, and
the administration of the bankruptcy estate. By necessity, this charge included an analysis of
existing authority under both the Bankruptcy Code, title 11 of the United States Code, and the
I.R.C., title 26 of the United States Code.
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tions.3 The first section contains a listing and discussion of twenty-
eight consensus items.4  The first twenty-five of the twenty-eight
items were presented to the NBRC at the May 1997 meeting and
twenty-four of the items were adopted unanimously.5 The second
section contains a listing and discussion of six consensus items.
6
The federal participants on the Advisory Committee abstained from
consideration of these proposals. The third section contains a list-
ing and discussion of twenty-nine proposals concerning those areas
of bankruptcy taxation that the Advisory Committee has deter-
mined are Very Important and Highly Controversial to Controver-
sial. Although short of a consensus on these contested issues, the
Advisory Committee has provided to the NBRC its recommenda-
tions and voting record on the twenty-nine proposals.8
3 See Tax Advisory Committee Final Report at 5-6 (August 1997) (hereinafter "TAC Re-
port").
4 See id. at 5.
5 The items adopted by the NBRC at the May 1997 meeting were: Track Nos. 105, 106,
109, 214 Part II, 216, 217(a), 311, 313, 315, 325, 326, 332, 334, 421, 422, 423, 424, 426, 702,
435(a), 437, 505, 701, and 711. Track No. 101 was considered by the NBRC but not adopted.
The Advisory Committee has supplemented the initial list to include additional consensus
items, including Track Nos. 441, 513(a), and 700. Id. at 6.
6 See id.
7 Id. Rather than initiate a new numbering system to track bankruptcy tax proposals, the
Advisory Committee continued the numbering and tracking system of the previous tax matri-
ces as a matter of convenience and in an effort to reduce confusion over discussions concern-
ing bankruptcy tax proposals. Those proposals added to the matrix by the Advisory Commit-
tee were assigned 700-series index numbers. Furthermore, where appropriate, the Advisory
Committee split multiple proposals into component parts; thus, original proposal No. 414 has
been redesignated Nos. 414, 414(a), and 414(b). SeeTAC Report, supra note 3, at 4.
8 Before the Advisory Committee was formed, much work on the interface between
bankruptcy and tax had been accomplished. The Department of Treasury, through the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department of justice prepared working papers on rele-
vant topics and proposals and participated informally in discussions. The National Association
of Attorneys General also submitted a number of tax proposals for consideration. The NBRC
held at least two working meetings in San Diego, California and Santa Fe, New Mexico where
many bankruptcy taxation issues were discussed and developed. NBRC Member James I.
Shepard has also undertaken an extensive study of the tax issues posed in the bankruptcy
process. Furthermore, the Government Working Group has discussed several tax issues. The
Special Task Force on Taxation of the NBRC has prepared an extensive report on bankruptcy
tax issues. The National Bankruptcy Conference has already prepared a report on bankruptcy
tax issues. Judges, trustees, and other concerned parties have submitted proposals for consid-
eration by the Advisory Committee and the NBRC. The combined efforts of the parties de-
scribed above have led to the development of a Tax Matrix in excess of ninety pages with well
over 100 proposals. While many of the proposals adopted by the NBRC were recommenda-
tions by the Advisory Committee, on occasion, the NBRC rejected the recommendation of the
Advisory Committee and adopted one of the competing proposals.
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I. TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR ESTATES
This part explores the NBRC proposals that are focused on
certain substantive federal, state and local tax consequences associ-
ated with an individual seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code.9
Presently, the Bankruptcy Code contains several tax provisions that
apply to state and local taxes only.10 The treatment of federal taxes
was deleted from the Bankruptcy Reform Act1 1 and later consid-
ered in the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 (the BTA).12 Unfortu-
nately, the treatment of federal taxes in bankruptcy under the BTA
does not conform to the treatment of state and local taxes under
the Bankruptcy Code even where the federal, state and local inter-
ests appear to be congruous. Much of the Advisory Committee's ef-
forts were centered on conforming the treatment of taxes and tax-
ing authorities in bankruptcy. Obviously, this task requires
amendment both to the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C.).13 Each of these proposals is addressed below.
A. Introduction to Taxation of Individual Debtor Estates
Filing a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code creates
an estate. 14 Property subject to exemption from distribution to
creditors is included in the definition of property of the estate until
it is, in fact, set aside as provided in § 522.15 It is this property of
9 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq. (1994).
10 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 346, 728, 1146, 1231.
It Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.LNo. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 etscq. (1994)).
12 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub.LNo. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§
108 et seq.).
1 I.R.C. § 1-9853 (1988).
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Property of the estate includes all of a debtor's legal or equi-
table interest in property at the time of filing of the petition wherever located and by whom-
ever held. Moreover, all the interest of a debtor and a debtor's spouse in community property
that is under the sole, equal, or joint management of the debtor is included in the estate. See
11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(2)(A). Furthermore, inheritances that come to a debtor within 180 days
after the filing of the petition, an interest in property because of a divorce decree or property
settlement agreement with a debtor's spouse, the proceeds of a life insurance policy or death
benefit plan, and the proceeds, rents, and profits from property included in the estate are all
included in the definition of property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(5) - (6).
15 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The Code initially allows a debtor to choose either the federal ex-
emptions set out in § 522(d) or exemptions available under state law. See id. However, the
Code permits the individual states to opt out of the federal exemption option so that debtors
domiciled in a particular state may be limited to the exemptions available under the law of that
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the estate that is subject to administration under the Bankruptcy
Code and is used to satisfy, among other things, prepetition
claims.
16
The general rule is that the creation of a bankruptcy estate has
no federal tax significance. Thus, any transfer of property by opera-
tion of law from a debtor to its bankruptcy estate, other than by sale
or exchange, is not a taxable event under the I.R.C.17 Moreover,
there is no change in the basis of any asset transferred. 18 Although
the transfer is technically a nontaxable event for the debtor, the
debtor does lose the benefit of the use of certain tax attributes that
automatically inure to the bankruptcy estate. 19 However, where an
individual debtor files for relief under either chapter 7 or 11, the
state. See I 1 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). Most states have opted out of the federal exemption system.
See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 51-1301.1(b) (1989). A few states permit debtors to choose the § 522(d)
exemptions or the exemptions available under state law. See, e.g., NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v.
Volpe, (In reVolpe), 120 B.R. 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (permitting debtor to choose either
federal or Texas exemptions because Texas has not enacted any law precluding debtors from
choosing between federal and Texas exemptions), afd, 943 F.2d 1451 (5th Cir. 1991).
16 ELIZABETH WARREN &JAY L WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 200
(1991).
17 See I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1).
18 The basis of an asset is generally its historic cost. See I.R.C. § 1012. Essentially, the
function of basis in the context of realization of gain or loss is to prevent the same dollars
from being taxed twice. Adjusted basis is the historic cost increased by capital expenditures
such as improvements to the asset and decreased by allowed depreciation. See LR.C. § 1016(a)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19 See I.R.C. § 139 8 (g) (1988). Presently, these tax attributes include net operating loss
carryovers as determined under I.R.C. § 172; excess charitable contribution carryovers as de-
termined under I.R.C. § 170(d)(l); the recovery of tax benefit items under I.R.C. § 11; cer-
tain credit carryovers; capital loss carryovers determined under I.R.C. § 1212; the basis, hold-
ing period, and character of property; the debtor's method of accounting; and other tax
attributes of the debtor, to the extent provided in regulations carrying out the purposes of
I.R.C. § 1398. See C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK F. WILLIAMS, TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPrCY
AW AND PRACTICE, § 6.10 (1997) for a helpful explanation of the listed attributes. Because the
tax attributes that pass from a debtor to his or her estate must be identified in I.R.C. § 13 9 8 (g)
or in a regulation, the list of attributes quickly becomes stale. Richard M. Lipton, Proposed 1398
Regs. Raise Conflict Between Debtors and Bankruptcy Trustees, 79 J. TAX'N 12-13 (1993). Recently,
the IRS added passive activity and at risk activity losses and credits to the list of tax attributes
that pass from debtor to the estate and back upon termination. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(d),
2(d) (1995). For an example of the harm to the estate resulting from the failure to include
passive activity and at risk activity losses and credits, see Lipton, supra, at 13. The new regula-
tions apply to all cases filed after November 9, 1992. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.398-1(f), -2(f). After the
petition is filed, the debtor may not use any of the tax attributes that were transferred to the
estate. So, although the estate is responsible for the tax liability related to the debtor's assets,
the bankruptcy estate also can use the debtor's tax attributes to reduce this liability. See Lipton,
supra, at 12.
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 14
bankruptcy estate of an individual debtor is a new taxable entity
separate from the individual debtor. 20
1. The Separate Entiy Rules: L. C. § 1398
Before enactment of the BTA in 1980, there existed no I.R.C.
provision regarding the tax treatment of a bankruptcy estate of an
individual.21 The treatment of the bankruptcy estate of an individ-
ual debtor was often inconsistent, incoherent, and unclear. The
IRS asserted that under the Bankruptcy Act, the estate of an indi-
vidual was taxable as an estate under I.R.C. § 641.22 The IRS drew
no distinction among straight or liquidating proceedings under
chapter 7, arrangements under chapter 11, and real property ar-
rangements under chapter 12.23
As part of the BTA, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 1398.24 Section
1398 applies to any case under either chapter 7 or chapter 11 where
the debtor is an individual.25 As previously noted, the bankruptcy
estate is treated as a separate taxable entity that may incur and
should pay its own tax liabilities.26 However, if the debtor's case is
20 SeeI.R.C. § 1398(e) (1988).
21 Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as amended) in chapter X (reorganization),
chapter Xl (arrangements), chapter XII (real property arrangements by persons other than
corporations), and chapter XIII (wage earner plans) contained tax provisions regarding the
treatment of discharged income, it was silent as to the tax treatment of an individual's estate in
bankruptcy.
22 Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 C.B. 632; Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301.
23 See Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301; see generally Tatlock, 466-2d T.M., Discharge of
Indebtedness, Bankruptcy and Insolventy, A-28 through A-30.
24 Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 3(a)(1), 94 Stat. 3389, 3397-400.
2 I.R.C. § 1398(b)(1). A partnership is not an individual for § 1398 purposes. See I.R.C. §
1398(b)(2). However, an individual debtor's interest in a partnership is treated in the same
manner as other property of the debtor.
26 See Blake D. Rubin, Tax Planning for the Debtor in Bankruptcy, 19 J. REAL EST. TAX'N
322, 326 (1992). Consistent with its separate entity status, an estate computes its own taxable
income in the same manner as an individual. I.R.C. § 1398(c)(1). The estate is taxed at the
same rate as a married individual filing separately. I.R.C. § 1398(c)(2)-(3). The chapter 7 or 11
trustee is required to file any returns required by law and to pay any taxes due. See Paul B. Gei-
lich, Essentials of Bankruptcy Tax Law, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 323, 323-24 (1992). For a thorough
treatment of a banrluptcy trustee's tax reporting and compliance duties, see IA COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 10.03 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1993). The trustee must file a re-
turn for each taxable year that the estate's gross income exceeds the standard deduction and
the exemption amount. For 1997, the basic standard deduction for a married individual filing a
separate income tax return is $3,450. I.R.C. § 63(c) (1988) (taking into account adjustments
for inflation). Even if the estate generates no income from sales or the operation of a business,
the estate may be liable for taxes generated by COD income or by sale and exchange, for ex-
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later dismissed, § 1398 no longer applies.2 7 Consequently, a previ-
ously made short-year election 28 is extinguished and all taxes in-
curred by the estate pass back to the debtor.
2 9
The transfer of property pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 41(a),
other than by sale or exchange, from the debtor to the new § 1398
taxable entity, the bankruptcy estate, is not a taxable event.30 The
estate is treated as the debtor with respect to the transferred prop-
erty. Thus, any gain or loss realized by the estate will have the same
character as though the property were still held by the debtor.
3 1
Furthermore, specific enumerated tax attributes of the debtor pass
to the estate under § 1398(g). 3 2 After the petition is filed, the
debtor may not use any of the tax attributes that were transferred to
the estate. 33 The premise behind the transfer of enumerated tax at-
tributes is a recognition that since the estate is responsible for the
ampic, a foreclosure on property that is property of the estate.
27 I.R.C. § 1398(b)(1).
28 See id. § 1398(d)(2). For an explanation of the short-year election, see infra Part 1.A.2.
29 See Geilich, supra note 26, at 329 (after dismissal of case debtor remains liable for
taxes not paid by estate).
-0 See I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1); Rev. RUl. 90-25, 1990-1 C.B. 10; seeRubin, supra note 26, at 326
("[T]ransfer of assets by the debtor to the estate ... is not treated as a disposition for pur-
poses of... assigning tax consequences to a disposition.").
31 I.R.C. § 1398(g)(6) (1988).
32 For a list of these attributes, see supra note 19.
33 The tax attributes are determined as of the first day of the debtor's taxable year in
which the bankruptcy case commences. For example, if the bankruptcy case commenced on
September 15, 1994, the tax attributes would be determined as of January 1, 1994. Just as the
transferor in an I.R.C. § 381 transaction no longer can use its tax attributes after reorganiza-
tion, the debtor cannot use his or her attributes in determining the debtor's tax liability for
periods commencing after the beginning of the bankruptcy case and before the case's comple-
tion. Thus, if in the frst year after commencement of the bankruptcy case, the debtor has tax-
able income and the bankruptcy estate has a net operating less, any losses or credit carryovers
of the debtor for the period prior to the bankruptcy case cannot be used by the debtor. Nor
can the debtor carry back any losses or unused credits arising from its activities after the bank-
ruptcy case commenced to the debtor's prebankruptcy taxable years. See I.R.C. §
1398(j)(2)(B). In order that the trustee of the bankruptcy estate may determine tax attribute
carryovers and be able to carry back losses and tax credits to prebankruptcy years of the
debtor, he or she must have access to the prior income tax returns of the debtor. The I.R.C.
provides that, upon written request, the income tax returns of the debtor for the taxable year
in which the voluntary bankruptcy case was commenced and for preceding years are open to
inspection by or disclosure to the trustee of a bankruptcy estate. See I.R.C. § 6103(e)(5)(A). A
debtor is given similar access to the returns of the bankruptcy estate. In an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case, however, disclosure to the trustee is not permitted until such time as an order for
relief has been entered by the bankruptcy court, or unless the bankruptcy court finds that dis-
closure is appropriate for purposes of determining whether an order for relief should be en-
tered. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(5)(C).
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tax liability related to the debtor's assets, the bankruptcy estate
should use the debtor's tax attributes to reduce this liability.34
Section 1398 furthers the fresh start policy embodied in the
Bankruptcy Code for individual debtors. The BTA Committee Re-
ports recognized that the purpose of bankruptcy is to enable a
debtor to begin anew his or her economic life.35 Congress recog-
nized that any expenses incurred by the estate should not burden a
debtor's fresh start.36 Consistent with this purpose is the § 1398 re-
quirement that the income and losses of the bankruptcy estate as a
separate taxable entity are computed separately from an individual
debtor.37 Furthermore, by making the short-year election, a debtor
can shift at least part of his or her tax liability to the estate as a
Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(8) priority claim.38 As a priority claim,
the tax liability will be paid in full before any payments are received
by the unsecured creditors.
Section 1398 further provides that a debtor's gross income for
any taxable year does not include any item to the extent it is in-
cluded in the estate's gross income.39 Conversely, gross income of
the estate does not include any amount received or accrued by a
debtor before the commencement of the case.40 Thus, § 1398 does
not allow double counting of income or losses by both the estate
and the debtor.
The determination whether any amount paid or incurred by the
estate is allowable as a deduction shall be made as if paid by the
debtor while the debtor was still engaged in the trade or business in
which the debtor was engaged before the commencement of the
case.4 1 It would appear that the same accounting method used for
income should be used for deductions. Additionally, the estate is
permitted to characterize some of its expenditures as trade or busi-
34 See Lipton, supra note 19, at 12.
35 S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 9-10, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C..A.N. at 7024-25.
36 See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1994) (providing for payment of administrative expenses incurred
by estate); id. § 507(a)(1) (ranking administrative expenses first in order of priority of claims
against the estate).
37 I.R.C. § 1398(e).
38 For a detailed discussion of the short-year election, see infra Part I.A.2.
39 See I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2).
40 See id.§ 1398(e)(1).
41 See id. § 1398(e)(3).
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ness expenses that can be used to offset current income of the es-
tate.4
2
2. The Short-Year Election: I.R.C. § 1398(d)
Section 1398(d)(2) permits a debtor to make an election by
which his or her taxable year is split into two taxable years.43 This
election is an important pre-bankruptcy planning tool by which to
minimize a debtor's tax liability. By electing in a timely fashion, a
debtor may divide the taxable year into two segments. The first tax-
able year ends on the day before the day the bankruptcy case was
commenced. 44 The second taxable year begins on the bankruptcy
commencement date.45 The effect of the short-year election is to
make prepetition taxes a § 507(a)(8) priority claim against the es-
tate.
The most significant effect of the short-year election is that any
tax liability for the first short-year becomes an allowed Bankruptcy
Code § 507(a)(8) priority claim against the estate. Thus, a debtor
may essentially force his or her unsecured creditors to pay all or
part of the first short-year claims. Of course, if there are insuffi-
cient assets to pay the first short-year tax claims in full, they do sur-
vive the bankruptcy as nondischargeable claims.46 If the debtor fails
to make the election, then any tax liability for the entire year is not
an allowable claim against the estate, even though the taxes relate to
income earned before the commencement of the case.47 Moreover,
if a debtor makes the election, then a debtor's tax attributes as of
the end of the first taxable year are transferred to the estate to be
used by the estate to shelter income. If the election is not made, a
debtor's tax attributes as of the end of the full taxable year after
commencement carryover to the debtor's net taxable year.
42 Furthermore, administrative expenses and any fees are deductible by the estate to the
extent not disallowed under another I.R.C. section. See id. § 1398(h)(1). If the administrative
cxpenses cannot be used in the current year, than they may be carried back as much as three
years and carried forward as much as seven years. See I.R.C. § 1398(h)(2).
43 See id. § 1398(d)(2); Geilich, supra note 26, at 329-30; Rubin, supra note 26, at 327-28.
44 See id. § 1398(d)(2)(A)(I).
45 See id. § 1398(d)(2)(A)(ii).
46 See 1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1994).
47 See S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 26 repinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7040-41; Rubin, supra
note 26, at 327.
1997]
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Presently, an individual debtor must elect to bifurcate his or
her tax year to take advantage of the tax benefits in I.R.C. § 1398.
This election must be made on or within the fifteenth day of the
fourth full month from the commencement of the case.4 8 Failure to
make the election in a timely manner results in a waiver of the
§ 1398 tax benefits. 49 The overwhelming majority of cases benefit
from the § 1398(d)(2) short-year election. Yet, many debtors fail to
make a timely election because of miscalculations or incompetent
counsel.
In the case of a termination of a debtor's estate, a transfer
other than by sale or exchange of an asset from the estate back to a
debtor is not a taxable event.50 Similarly, upon termination of a
debtor's estate, a debtor succeeds to the unused tax attributes ear-
lier passed to the estate.51 The I.R.C., however, is silent on what
constitutes a "termination" of a debtor's estate. Clearly, when the
case is closed under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's estate has
terminated. The question, however, is whether something short of a
closing may constitute a termination.5 2 This question is explored in
Part I.D. in the discussion of the tax consequences of bankruptcy
abandonment.
48 See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(D) (election must be made prior to due date for filing frst
short-year return); Id. § 6072 (returns made on basis of fiscal year to be filed by 15th day of
fourth month following close of fiscal year); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-14T (as amended in
1992) (permitting elections up to 15th day of fourth full month following close of taxable
year); see also Geilich, supra note 26, at 329.
49 See In re Turboff, 93 B.R. 523, 526 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (debtor's reasons for fail-
ure to timely make election are irrelevant to application of § 1398).
50 See I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2).
51 See id. § 1398(i) (1988); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(e), -2(e) (1995). The IRS has
been justifiably criticized for its delay in adding tax attributes to the § 1398 list. One distin-
guished commentator has suggested adding investment interest deductions, suspended S cor-
poration losses, and percentage depletion carryovers. See Lipton, supra note 19, at 13
(criticizing omission of certain tax attributes from § 1398(g), allowing them to remain with
debtor).
52 SeeJack F. Williams, The Tax Consequences of Abandonment Under dhe Bankruptcy Code, 67
TEMP. L REV. 13, 45 (1994):
To equate "termination" under I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) with "closing the case" under
Bankruptcy Code § 350 is improper. Although closing a case is a form of termina-
tion, it does not exhaust all forms of termination.... (Congress] could have easily
used the term "closing" in I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2).... Congress chose not to do so....
[Vol. 14
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3. Transfer of Tax Attributes under LR. C. § 1398(g) and (i)
Under I.R.C. § 1398(g), the estate succeeds to certain enumer-
ated tax attributes of the debtor upon commencement of the
case.5 3 One of the more controversial issues concerning § 1398 is
whether the IRS should add more tax attributes to the list of those
attributes that pass to the estate from the individual under §
139 8(g). Commentators have suggested adding investment interest
deductions, suspended S corporation losses, percentage depletion
carryovers, and one-time exclusions from the sale of a residence.
54
In the rush to add tax attributes to § 1398(g), one must remain cog-
nizant of the effect of adding to the list. Courts take the position
that only those attributes in § 1398(g), or those added to the list by
the IRS, pass to the estate.55 Any remaining tax attributes remain
with the debtor. The effect of adding tax attributes is to transfer
those attributes from the debtor to the estate at the expense of the
debtor's fresh start. Thus, attributes not listed in § 1398(g), like ex-
empt property, help fuel a debtor's fresh start by shielding future
income.
B. Proposals to Conform State and Local Tax Treatment
Because of the different tracks taken by the Bankruptcy Code
regarding state and local taxes as opposed to the BTA regarding
federal taxes, different treatment of individual debtor chapter 7
and 11 estates by federal, state, and local taxing authorities exists.
Several examples will prove the point. The Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that the estate is taxed like an "estate" for state and local tax
purposes, 5 6 while the I.R.C. provides that the estate is taxed as an
individual.5 7 The Bankruptcy Code provides that for state and local
tax purposes. any unused attributes pass back to the individual
when the case is "closed, " 58 while for federal tax purposes, the at-
53 For a list of these attributes, see supra note 19.
54 See Lipton, supra note 19, at 13; see also Nancy R. Crow, Tax Tips and Tricks in Workouts
and Bankruptcy, REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCY, 1993 (PLI Real Est. L Practice
Handbook Series No. N4-4574, 1993).
55 See Distasio v. United States, 22 CI. Ct. 36, 52 (1990); Reuter v. Robertson (In re
Reuter), 158 B.R. 163, 166-67 (N.D. Cal. 1993); In re Mehr, 153 B.R. 430, 436-38 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1993).
56 11 U.S.C. § 346(b)(2) (1994).
57 See I.R.C. § 1398(c)(1).
58 11 U.S.C. § 346(i)(2).
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tributes pass back at "termination," 59 an undefined event. The
Bankruptcy Code provides that if a short-year election is made, the
first-short year ends on the date of the order for relief,60 while un-
der the I.R.C. the first-short year ends on the day before the com-
mencement of the case.61 These unjustifiable differences in how an
estate is treated by the different taxing regimes lead trustees to
keep several books to accommodate the discrepancies. The NBRC
has attacked these discrepancies head on.
The Advisory Committee found that there is no justification to
maintain two systems in the Bankruptcy Code that provide for the
transfer of different tax attributes based on federal versus state and
local tax questions. There is also no justification for the period of a
federal tax year or years being different from a state and local tax
year or years. Consequently, the NBRC found that state and local
tax treatment should conform to federal treatment.
Pursuant to that end, the NBRC unanimously adopted Pro-
posal 217(a). Proposal 217(a) provides that the treatment of state
and local taxes should conform to that of federal taxes regarding a
debtor's tax year election 62 and regarding those tax attributes that
are transferred to the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy. 63
Proposals 426 and 702 list many of the specific proposed
amendments to 11 U.S.C. §§ 346, 728, 1146, and 1231 sought to
achieve this conformity. The proposed amendments to § 346 in-
dude:
1. Section 346(a) should be revised to provide that for state and lo-
cal tax purposes, the provisions of the I.R.C. of 1986 are to be used:
(a) to determine when a separate estate is created as the result of
the filing of a bankruptcy petition;
(b) to determine which attributes, that are available under state
and local tax laws, are transferred to the estate on the filing of a
bankruptcy petition and are transferred back to the individual on
termination of the estate;
(c) to determine how income (to the extent provided for under
state and local laws) from the estate (when created) is taxed or
59 I.R.C. § 1398(i).
60 See II U.S.C. §§ 728(a), 1146(a).
61 See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A).
62 Seeid. § 1398(d).
63 Seeid. § 1398.
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deductions (to the extent provided for under state and local laws)
are allowed;
(d) to determine how income from the cancellation of debt is to
be reported and how basis and other tax attributes (to the extent
they are available under state law) are reduced; and
(e) to determine the tax consequences of transfers between bank-
ruptcy estate and individual debtor.
2. A new subsection should be added to provide that the applicable
state and local tax rates (rather than federal rates) should be used to
determine any tax liability or refund for state and local taxes.
3. A new subsection should be added to provide that it is the respon-
sibility of the trustee to file federal, state and local tax returns (when
required under applicable federal, state and local laws) for a sepa-
rate estate created by the filing of a bankruptcy petition and for
partnerships and corporations filing bankruptcy petitions.6
4. Sections 346(b) through (e) and (g) through (j) should be re-
pealed. (Section 1398 addresses the applicable issues.)
5. Section 346(f) should be modified to provide that the same pro-
visions apply to federal tax law as well as deals with payment of with-
held items.
The Advisory Committee also recommended and the NBRC
proposed the repeal of §§ 728(a) through (d), 1146(a), and 1146(b)
because of the new proposed provisions in § 346.65 Finally, the
NBRC proposed that § 1231 should be repealed outright. No sepa-
rate taxable entity should be created in chapter 12.
In Proposal 435(a), thie NBRC advocated an amendment to 11
U.S.C. § 346 and I.R.C. § 1398 to provide that for puiposes of mak-
ing the election to close the debtor's tax year, the time period for
making such election commences on the date the order for relief is
entered. This Proposal is a direct response to the situation created
by the commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case under
chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Presently, I.R.C.
§ 1398(d)(2) links the period by which an election must be made to
the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed. This poses no problem
in a voluntary case commenced under 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (the
date the petition is filed is also the date an order for relief is en-
64 SeeJames L Shepard & Jack F. Williams, The Duty of a Trustee to File Returns on Behalf of
the Debtor Partnership, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L REV. 295 (1995).
65 Section 1146(c) dealing with stamp and similar taxes is not addressed. Section
1146(d) dealing with the request to determine the tax impact of a plan is listed as a separate
item and should not be dealt with in the NBRC Report.
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tered in the bankruptcy case). However, in an involuntary case
commenced under I 1 U.S.C. § 303, the petition may be filed some-
times months before the order for relief is entered by the court.
During the involuntary gap period, the debtor may continue to op-
erate as though no bankruptcy case has been filed. There appears
no reason to link the election under I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2) to the filing
of the petition in these circumstances. Rather, the more appropri-
ate event to link the beginning of the time period by which to make
the (d)(2) election is the entry of the order for relief.
Through Proposal 437, the NBRC has addressed a practical
problem of tax practice. The Proposal seeks to clarify I.R.C. § 1398
to provide that the bankruptcy estate's income is subject to the al-
ternative minimum tax66 and capital gains tax treatment67 if other-
wise applicable. Some confusion exists as to whether the bank-
ruptcy estate is exempt from the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).
Presently, some bankruptcy trustees take the position that the bank-
ruptcy estate is exempt from the AMT but may employ capital gains
treatment. The NBRC concluded that these inconsistent positions
should be reconciled.
In Proposal 714, the NBRC sought to clarify a troubling appli-
cation of I.R.C. § 1398. In particular, the NBRC proposed an
amendment to I.R.C. § 1398(e)(3) to provide that a debtor should
be treated as an employee of the bankruptcy estate as to payments
by the estate of estate assets to the debtor for services performed.
Under present law, it is unclear whether when the estate pays estate
assets to the debtor those payments should be treated as ordinary
income, 1099 income, or a distribution.68 The Proposal provides
that payments of estate assets to the debtor for services performed
are to be treated as ordinary income, providing the estate with a
corresponding deduction. It is not the intent of the NBRC to sug-
gest that income from future services performed postpetition by
the individual debtor is itself property of the estate. 69 Rather, this
clarification speaks to property that is already property of the estate
66 National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Proposal 437 (1997).
67 National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Proposal 714 (1997).
68 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-28-056 (Apr. 15, 1987).
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(6) (1994). SeeJack F. Williams, The Federal Tax Consequences of
Individual Debtor OQapter 11 Cases, 46 S.C. L Rev. 1203, 1214-30 (1995) (discussing several
views on this issue).
[Vol. 14
NBRC Tax Recommendations
that the estate seeks to use to pay the debtor for services per-
formed.
C. Tax Consequences of a Sale of the Debtor's Residence
Two of the most controversial proposals involve the tax conse-
quences of a sale of the debtor's residence in bankruptcy. Propos-
als 411 and 436(a) would make available the exclusion of gain rec-
ognition on sale of an individual debtor's residence by the trustee.
Under current law as amended by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
any individual can sell a personal residence and exclude $250,000
(or $500,000 if joint filers) of gain. The exclusion is not available
to bankruptcy estates because a bankruptcy estate cannot have a
personal residence. 70
Because Congress increased the amount of the exclusion and
eliminated the age restriction, the NBRC believes the exclusion
should be available to bankruptcy estates. Not allowing the exclu-
sion to the bankruptcy estate creates a hidden, nonuniform exemp-
tion and runs counter to the NBRC proposals to create uniform ex-
emptions. All else being equal, debtors with low-basis residences
receive a larger exemption than debtors with high-basis residences.
Trustees recognize this and are less likely to sell the low-basis resi-
dence. Also, a hidden incentive is created to file for bankruptcy if
the debtor recognizes that the trustee will have to abandon the resi-
dence because of the burdens of secured debt and homestead and
gain on sale taxes. For example, assume a gain on sale of $56,000
(.28 x $200,000). If the debtor sells the residence after filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor keeps the $56,000 gain, in lieu of a payment
to the unsecured creditors.
Under current law, if the trustee sells the personal residence,
the trustee is responsible for 100% of the tax due.7 1 This is true
even if a substantial portion of the proceeds are distributed to the
debtor in the form of an exemption. If uniform exemptions are
adopted and if the exclusion rule is expanded and made available
to bankruptcy estates, then the NBRC believes current law should
not be changed and the homestead should not carry tax. However,
if wide variations in the personal residence exemption remain in the
70 SeePergament v. United States (In re Barden), 105 F.3d 821 (2d Cir. 1997).
7t See In re Card, 114 B.R. 226 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990); Waldschraidt v. I.R.S. (In re
Lambdin), 33 B.R. 11 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
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Bankruptcy Code, the NBRC believes a pro rata share of the gain
should be taxed to the debtor. The following ratio could be used:
exemption paid to debtor is to amount realized from sale, as tax al-
locable to debtor is to total tax due on sale. Regardless, these pro-
posals evidence a change in how the sale of personal residences
should be treated in bankruptcy.
D. Tax Treatment of Abandonment
Finally, Proposal 425 deals with the tax treatment of property
which is abandoned by an estate and reverts to the debtor. This is-
sue was one of the most problematic because it pits fundamental
and opposed bankruptcy policies against one another. Let us un-
pack in greater detail just what is at stake in the abandonment con-
text.
The issue of the tax consequences of abandonment is limited
to individual bankruptcies under chapter 7 or chapter 11 because
I.R.C. § 1398 creates a separate entity for tax purposes only in those
types of cases-the bankruptcy estate. 72 The engine that drives the
controversy is a debtor's desire to avoid the deferred taxes on over-
encumbered property with a low basis. Ideally, a debtor seeks to
capture the consequences of foreclosure in the estate so that, pur-
suant to I.R.C. § 1398, the tax is a liability of the estate and not the
debtor.
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the I.R.C. considers the fed-
eral tax implications of property abandoned by the estate before
the close of the case.73 The conflicting interests at stake, however,
may be understood easily with an example. Assume that an individ-
ual debtor owns an office building subject to nonrecourse indebt-
edness of $1 million. The fair market value of the property is
$500,000. The adjusted basis in the property has been reduced
over time to $250,000. The debtor has incurred net operating
losses ("NOLs") and carryovers of $250,000 related to the business
property. If the lender forecloses on the property in full satisfac-
tion of the debt, the foreclosure is a taxable event giving rise to a
72 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8928012 (Apr. 7, 1989) (separate entity rules do not apply to chapter
12 estates).
73 Authorities often refer to this as "midstream" abandonment. Nonetheless, I I U.S.C.
§ 346(g)(1)(B) does provide that for state and local tax purposes, a midstream abandonment is
not a taxable event. See Mark Wallace, Is a Midstream Abandonment of Property by a Bankruptcy
Trustee Taxable to the Estate?, 77 TAX'N 27 (1992).
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gain or loss.74 Here, the amount realized is a gain of $750,000, the
difference between the amount of nonrecourse debt and the ad-
justed basis.75 Often, this gain represents nothing more than phan-
tom income.76
If the foreclosure occurs while the property is property of the
estate, then the estate must recognize the gain and pay the tax. In
fact, the tax claim is a §§ 503(b)(1)(B) and 507(a)(1) priority claim,
which is paid in full ahead of all other claims (such as employee
wages, pension plan claims, and tort claimants) except secured
claims and other administration expense claims (the latter sharing
pro rata with the tax claim).77 If there are insufficient assets in the
estate to pay the tax, the tax goes unpaid; the debtor is not liable
for any deficiency. If the property is abandoned by the trustee be-
fore foreclosure, the debtor must recognize the gain and pay the
tax even though the tax attributes associated with the property re-
main with the estate to shelter estate tax liability. The opportunity
to jettison burdensome or inconsequential property in these cir-
cumstances helps the trustee in his or her efforts to maximize the
recovery of the unsecured creditors but at the expense of the
debtor. 78
Under present law, the model of bankruptcy abandonment
embraced by most courts and the IRS is explicated by the Eighth
Circuit in In re Olson.7 9 In Olson, the court held that abandonment
was not a taxable event, rejecting the fresh start argument embraced
later by the court in In re A.J. Lane & Co.80 After the debtors filed a
chapter 7 petition, the chapter 7 trustee abandoned certain prop-
74 See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1946). Because the debt is nonrecourse, no
cancellation of indebtedness income will arise when property is used to satisfy the debt in full.
See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983). Tufts treats the nonrecourse debtor as
having sold the underlying collateral for the amount of the debt.
75 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 300 (the one-step analysis is used for nonrecourse debt satisfied
by property; the fair market value of the property is irrelevant to the calculation of the amount
realized).
76 See Marc E. Grossberg, Tax Consequences of Abandonment of An Asset of a Bankrupt Estate,
50m N.Y.U. INsTITrE 12-1, 12-2 (1992).
7 See generally Wallace, supra note 73.
78 See Williams, supra note 52, at 28-40 (discussing the power, limitations, and effort of
abandonment in bankruptcy).
79 See Samone v. Olson (In re Olson) 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991). The Olson model is
based, in part, on the opinions in Erickson v. United States (In re Bentley), 916 F.2d 431 (8th
Cir. 1990), and In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
8o 133 B.R.. 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
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erty that was subsequently sold by a secured creditor under state
foreclosure proceedings.8' The individual debtors hired an ac-
countant to prepare federal and state income tax returns for the
bankruptcy estate. These returns reported a gain realized from the
sale of the property as a liability of the bankruptcy estate. The
debtors claimed that the estate was nevertheless liable for the tax.
The trustee did not authorize the debtors to prepare and file the
tax returns for the estate.
The bankruptcy court in Olson observed that under I.R.C.
§ 1398(f)(2) a "transfer ' 82 includes the release of an estate's inter-
est in property by abandonment.85 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy
court stopped short of accepting the debtors' argument based on an
extension of the holding in Yarbro v. Commissioner, which would
equate bankruptcy abandonment with tax or property abandon-
ment.84 In Yarbro, the taxpayer abandoned property under princi-
ples of property and tax law. Pursuant to those principles, applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law abandonment operates as a sale or exchange
and is effective in relinquishing title in the property.8 5 The Yarbro
court suggested that the finding of an exchange requires a giving, a
receipt, and a nexus between the two.8 6 The bankruptcy court in
Olson found that the bankruptcy abandonment did not transfer title,
did not relinquish title in the debtors, and did not result in a
"receipt" required for an exchange. 87
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In holding that no taxable event
occurred when the trustee abandoned the property, the Eighth Cir-
cuit said that it could see no reason why abandonment during the
administration of the case should have any different tax conse-
quences than abandonment of property at the close of the bank-
ruptcy case, which is not a taxable event pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 1398(f)(2). 88
81 The debtors did not object to the proposed abandonment. In re Olson, 100 B.R. at
460.
82 For the broad definition of transfer, see 11 U.S.C. § 161 (54) (1994).
83 See ln re Olson, 100 B.R. at 462.
84 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984).
85 See id. at 483-84.
86 See id.
87 See Inre Olson, 100 B.R. at 462-63.
88 This was a point the bankruptcy court also asserted in justifying its holding. See id. at
463.
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The court commented that In re Bentlz9 9 involved a separate but
related issue of the bankruptcy estate's liability for tax on gain from
the sale of "non-abandoned property of the estate." The taxable
event in Bently that triggered a tax liability chargeable to the estate
was the sale of the property. However, title to property abandoned
by the trustee reverts to the debtor as though it never had been
property of the estate, and a subsequent sale of abandoned prop-
erty is not a taxable event for which the bankruptcy estate can be
held liable. In Olson, the sale of the debtors' property occurred af-
ter the trustee abandoned the property. Therefore, the Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that abandonment is not a taxable event that trig-
gered a tax liability of the estate. The court concluded that
property abandoned by the trustee reverts to the debtor and is
treated as though the property never had been property of the es-
tate.
90
The IRS's position is consistent with Olson and its progeny.
In a private letter ruling, the IRS stated that abandonment during a
bankruptcy case has no tax consequences to the estate because
"termination of the estate" as it appears in I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) in-
cludes termination of the estate's interest in property because of
abandonment or exemption.
9 1
The IRS issued final regulations under I.R.C. § 1398, which
provide that a transfer of an interest in a passive activity loss or
credit or an at risk activity loss or credit under I.R.C. § 465 to the
debtor as exempt under Bankruptcy Code § 522 or if abandoned
89 See Erickson v. United States (In re Bentley), 916 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1990). In Bentley,
the Eighth Circuit held that the postpetition sale of corn by a chapter 7 trustee was a taxable
event for which the bankruptcy estate is liable. In that case, the chapter 7 trustee sold the
debtor's corn crop and thereafter, retained the sale proceeds for approximately 30 months
before abandoning the proceeds to a secured creditor. The IRS then asserted a tax claim
against the debtor's estate upon the grounds that the proceeds and profits from the sale of the
corn constituted property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) and pursuant to
I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) which provides that the gross income of the debtor's estate includes the
gross income of the debtor to which the estate is entitled under the Bankruptcy Code.
90 It appears the Olson court used these legal fictions regarding bankruptcy abandon-
ment. For other cases holding abandonment in bankruptcy is not a taxable event, see Mason v.
Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Burpo, 148 B.R. 918 (Bankr. W. D. Mo.
1993); In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1991); Fst Carolina Fm. Corp. v. Trustee
(In re Caron), 50 B.R. 27 (Bankr. N. D. Ga. 1984); In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1981). See also In reAyers, 137 B.R. 397 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).
91 See Priv. Let. Rul. 90-17-075 (Jan. 31, 1990). The IRS reaffirmed its position in a sub-
sequent letter ruling. See Priv. Let. Rul. 92-45023.
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under Bankruptcy Code § 554 is a nontaxable transfer.92 In sup-
port of the regulations, the IRS cited Olson.
In summary, there are several persuasive reasons against tax-
able abandonment. First, abandonment is a disclaimer of interest
by the estate, a release of the trustee's judicial lien; title and/or
possession have remained all along in the debtor. Thus, there was
no sale, exchange, or other disposition from the estate to the
debtor. Second, the termination of the estate's interest in property
through abandonment is congruous to "termination of the estate"
in I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2). To equate "termination" under I.R.C.
§ 1398(f)(2) with "closing the case" under Bankruptcy Code § 350
is improper. Although closing a case is a form of termination, it
does not exhaust all forms of termination. After all, if Congress
sought to equate termination under I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) with case
closings under Bankruptcy Code § 350, it could have easily used the
term "closing" in I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) instead of the term
"termination." Congress chose not to do this even though Bank-
ruptcy Code § 350 predates I.R.C. § 1398. Third, requiring foreclo-
sure of the property while part of the estate results in any tax liabil-
ity being treated as an administrative expense claim that will be paid
not only before the unsecured creditors, but also before all priority
claims under Bankruptcy Code §§ 507(a)(2) through (a)(7). 93
Therefore, the other administrative expense claims like attorney's
fees of the debtor and trustee, the trustee's fees, bankruptcy fees,
other estate taxes, and certain postpetition tort claims, may not be
paid in full; they must share pro rata with the current-year tax claim.
Moreover, certain employee wage claims, pension fund claims, and
consumer claims may never receive any distribution. Thus, delaying
an inevitable property foreclosure through a dilatory bankruptcy fil-
ing may reward a debtor at the expense of all his or her creditors.
This result makes no sense. Fourth, if there are insufficient assets
in the estate to pay the tax liability, it will never be paid. The
debtor does not owe the tax.94 Fifth, it would appear that because
abandonment is treated as a taxable event, the basis of the property
92 SeeTreas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1, 1.1398-2. Carryover of Passive Activity Losses and Credits
and At Risk Losses to Bankruptcy Estates of Individuals, 57 Fed. Reg. 53300 (proposed Nov. 9,
1992).
93 Accord JAMES L. SHEPARD, THE TRUSTEE'S BANKRuPTCYTAX MANUAL 88 (1992) (noting
that taxes incurred during estate adminsitration are first priority expenses).
94 See id.
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might be "stepped up" to its fair market value on abandonment. 95
This may result in a windfall to the debtor especially where the
foreclosure never occurs.96 Sixth, as constructed, I.R.C. § 1398
provides a mechanism by which a debtor may shift at least part of
any tax liability by allowing the taxable event to occur before filing
the bankruptcy petition and electing to terminate the taxable year.
97
Thus, the symmetry of I.R.C. § 1398 between liability and attributes
may be preserved and settlements between a debtor and creditor
before a bankruptcy filing encouraged. Seventh, abandonment is
not tantamount to foreclosure. Most often, the automatic stay will
prevent the foreclosure at least until the creditor obtains relief
from the stay. Meanwhile, the debtor could attempt to settle the
matter in a manner minimizing the tax consequences. Finally, al-
though important, a debtor's fresh start is not absolute. In fact,
under the Bankruptcy Code it is a rebuttable presumption.
98 Con-
gress has subordinated a debtor's fresh start to several tax claims,
including current-year taxes.99
The case that supports the proposition that the estate should
shoulder the tax consequences associated with the abandonment
and subsequent foreclosure of property is In re A.J. Lane & Co.100
Lane stands in stark contrast to Olson and is often referred to as the
minority view. In Lane, the court denied the chapter I1 trustee's
motion to abandon property of the estate essentially because the
debtor's tax liability would impair the debtor's fresh start. There,
the trustee sought to abandon two properties and a partnership in-
terest in a partnership that owned a third property under Bank-
ruptcy Code § 554.101 The debtor objected, arguing that the sub-
stantive grounds in Bankruptcy Code § 554 for abandonment were
not met and that the abandonment "would shift foreclosure tax
consequences from the bankruptcy estate to the debtor and would
destroy debtor's opportunity for a fresh start., 10 2 Clearly, the trus-
95 See Williams, supra note 52, at 46 (noting the unfariness of a "stepped-up" basis in
these circumstances).
96 I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2).
97 Seei. § 1398(d)(2) (1988).
18 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1994).
99 Accord id. §§ 507(a), 523(a)(1).
101 133 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
101 The motion was amended to exclude two of the properties that were subsequently re-
financed. See id. at 266-67.
102 See id. at 266.
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tee's sole reason for abandoning the property was to avoid the sub-
stantial income tax liability upon foreclosure on property that was
of inconsequential value to the estate and burdensome to adminis-
ter. 10 3 The facts show that the estate would have incurred a tax li-
ability of about $3.27 million on all the properties after using avail-
able loss carryovers.1 °4 The debtor's tax liability would have been
about $13 million. The debtor probably would not have been able
to reduce taxable income by loss carryovers because those tax at-
tributes were transferred to the estate pursuant to I.R.C. § 1398(g)
and would not be transferred back to the debtor, if at all, until the
estate terminated. 105
The Lane court gave three reasons for denying the trustee's
motion to abandon the property. 10 6 First, because the facts sug-
gested that foreclosure on the property was imminent, the Court
Holding10 7 doctrine persuaded the court to view the abandonment
as a transfer from the estate directly to the secured lender with the
debtor as a mere conduit. Second, the court held that abandon-
ment itself is a taxable event, and that to shift the tax consequences
to the debtor would destroy the symmetry of I.R.C. § 1398 that in-
tends to link a tax liability with its tax attributes. Third, the court
held that to allow a trustee to abandon overencumbered, low-basis
103 See id.
104 See generally Craig IV. Friedrich, Workouts; 1992J. REAL EST. TAX'N 94, 95.
105 See l.R.C. § 1398(i) (1988). Thus, there was a substantial difference between the
debtor's and the estate's tax liability-a $10 million dollar swing.
t06 Aside from the reasons discussed in the text of the Article, the Lane court also ques-
tioned the merits of the abandonment. Although there existed no equity in the properties, the
court observed there, nevertheless, might be value in the propcrties for the estate. The court
based this observation on two points: Fiwst, the court suggested that Bankruptcy Code § 506(a),
which defines a secured claim, applied and made it more likely than not that value existed for
the estate; second, a trustee could use the cramidown provisions in chapter 11, see 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b) (1994), to retain the property for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. Aside from
the time-honored rule that vests in a trustee broad discretion in deciding to abandon property
under Bankruptcy Code § 554, the Lane court's observations made no sense. The secured
creditors were seeking foreclosure. Section 506(a) would not help, especially when the prop-
erty is not appreciating. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). The secured claims com-
pletely enveloped the value of the properties. Finally, cramdown is not a panacea; it is also a
lot easier to threaten than it is to successfully invoke under § 1129(b). Thus, the value to which
the Lane court alluded was whimsical at best.
107 See Commissionerv. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (the substance of a trans-
action viewed as a whole is controlling for tax purposes). In Court Holding, the Supreme Court
articulated the "step-transaction" doctrine which requires that we collapse each separate step
in the transaction into one transaction, thereby ensuring that the substance of the transaction
controls over its form.
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property would severely throttle the fresh start policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 108 Each rationale for the Lane court's holding is ad-
dressed in turn.
The court's application of the Court Holding doctrine is unper-
suasive even on the particular facts in Lane. 109 In essence, the court
concluded that the estate would abandon directly to the creditor
with the debtor being a conduit. Foreclosure, however, does not
necessarily follow abandonment. In fact, most often a creditor
could not have foreclosed until it obtained relief from the stay un-
der Bankruptcy Code § 362(d). Furthermore, operation of the stay
as well as any applicable statutory periods under state law would
have permitted a now more motivated debtor to workout the situa-
tion with the creditor. 110  Finally, NBRC Commissioner Jim
Shepard cleverly and convincingly dispatches with the Lane court's
reliance on the Court Holding doctrine. Shepard shows that the Lane
court in fact extracted the abandonment from the "complete"
transaction. 111 According to Shepard, the beginning point in view-
ing the Court Holding doctrine should include the point at which the
debtor decided to seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Thus,
bankruptcy relief is but one step through which the property passed
from the debtor to his or her creditors. 112 In other words, where we
begin the step-transaction analysis under the Court Holding doctrine
is not as self-evident as the Lane court appears to suggest.
The second reason the court offered is that abandonment is a
taxable event, a position inconsistent with all prior authorities. 113
Clearly, a foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is a taxable
108 For a case adopting the Lane analysis, see In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897 (Bankr. D. Md.
1992).
109 The Court Holding doctrine is always a facts and circumstances test. See Grossberg,
supra note 76, at 12-8.
110 Seeid.
I I See Shepard, supra note 93, at 72.
112 See id. at 73. The Lane court's reliance on the Court Holding doctrine denies the essen-
tial factual foundation of Court Holding. In Court Holding, the Supreme Court characterized
the transaction as an attempt to evade taxes through the negotiations between the parties. See
Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 708. There a corporation was attempting "to transfer property al-
ready the subject of a sales transaction to another party for the sole purpose of having the
other taxed on the sale." Id. In the abandonment context there is no attempt to evade taxes,
merely an attempt to shift liability from the debtor to the estate.
113 See, e.g., In re Oson, 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991) (abandonment is not a taxable event);
In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
1997]
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL
event. 114 But is abandonment a taxable event? I think not. As sug-
gested here, if a debtor's interest has always remained in the prop-
erty, albeit subordinated to the estate's interest until abandonment,
there can be no sale, exchange, or disposition from the estate to the
debtor upon abandonment-the debtor always owned the property.
Moreover, a basic tenet of tax law is that form does control some-
times. 115 If bankruptcy law treats abandoned property as if it had
never been property of the estate, tax law should acquiesce. If
abandoned property is not property of the estate, abandonment
cannot be a taxable event.1 16
To justify the conclusion that abandonment is a taxable event,
the court reviewed I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2). Section 1398(f)(2) provides
that the transfer back to a debtor from the estate is not a disposi-
tion when the transfer occurs with the termination of the estate, un-
less by sale or exchange. In Lane, the court held that the abandon-
ment was not tantamount to the termination of the estate as
required by ][.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) and must, therefore, be a taxable
event. This justification was expressly rejected by the court in In re
McGowan, which held that "termination of the estate" for purposes
of I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) included the termination of the estate's inter-
est in property under Bankruptcy Code § 554(a). 117
'The confusion is created by using the word "terminate" in
I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2). Does "terminate" mean the case is closed un-
der Bankruptcy Code § 350? The IRS has taken such a position, I
believe unjustifiably. 118 Exactly when the estate terminates for
I.R.C. § 1398 purposes remains unclear. For example, in a chapter
11 case, confirnation of the plan and postconfirmation operation
even for a number of years is not congruous to closing the case un-
der Bankruptcy Code § 350. Thus, something less than a Bank-
ruptcy Code § 350 "closing" should satisfy the termination re-
quirement under I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2). Therefore, the better
argument is that once the estate's interest in the property termi-
114 See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510 (1941)(recourse debt); Helvcring v. Ne-
braska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666 (1941)(nonrecoursc debt).
115 See Friedrich, supra note 104, at 96 n. 21.
116 See Shepard, supra note 93, at 76.
117 In reMcGowan, 95 B.R. at 108.
118 See Shepard, supra note 93, at 66 (citing IRS letter for that proposition and noting that
position is inconsistent with In re Sonner, 53 B.R. 859 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985)(for tax purposes
a chapter 11 case terminates when plan is conf'rmed)).
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nates through abandonment, it terminates for I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2)
purposes as to the property abandoned.1 19
The Lane court embraced a "strict" interpretation of I.R.C.
§ 1398(f)(2) in concluding that abandonment is a "sale or ex-
change" for tax purposes. This argument, however, proves too
much. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1), which governs the transfer of assets and
liabilities from the debtor to the estate upon the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, makes the transfer a nonrecognition event unless it
is by "sale or exchange." According to the Lane court, if the trans-
fer-if one even exists-from the estate to the debtor pursuant to
abandonment under Bankruptcy Code § 554 is a "sale or ex-
change," then the transfer from the debtor to the estate also would
be a "sale or exchange," taking that transfer out of nonrecognition
status under I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1). Thus, the transfer by a debtor to
the estate becomes a realization event. Reliance on Lane and the
Court Holding doctrine suggests such an analysis. 120 Of course, this
analysis eviscerates the essential purpose behind I.R.C. § 1398.
In suggesting that bankruptcy abandonment is a taxable event,
the Lane court also relied on Yarbro v. Commissioner 2 1 and similar
tax court decisions. In Yarbro, the Fifth Circuit characterized aban-
donment under tax law as a sale or exchange, and, thus, a taxable
event. In a situation where an abandonment under applicable non-
bankruptcy law of over-encumbered property has occurred, a tax-
payer receives a taxable benefit in the amount the secured debt is
discharged. 122 Therefore, applicable nonbankruptcy abandonment
becomes an event no different in tax significance than a foreclosure
sale or deed in lieu. Asserting that a trustee conveyed property and
received a benefit in the form of relief from the secured debt, the
court regarded the reasoning in Yarbro as "inescapable."
Where the Lane court erred was in equating tax abandonment
with bankruptcy abandonment. The concept of abandonment for
general tax purposes borrows heavily from the common law of
property. In contrast, bankruptcy abandonment is a creature of
statute; it has a specific meaning in bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy
abandonment is a disclaimer by the estate of any interest in a spe-
cific asset of the debtor. Thus, the debtor's interest in the property
t19 Accordln reOlson, 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991).
120 See Wallace, upr note 73, at 29-30.
121 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir.1984).
122 Accord In reA.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 270 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
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remains undisturbed. To attempt to artificially weld the two dis-
tinct concepts of abandonment together would deny a rich and vi-
brant history associated with bankruptcy abandonment and the pe-
culiar nature and purpose of this statutory beast. 123
A corollary to the second justification relied on by the court in
Lane is that to allow the trustee to abandon the property would de-
stroy the symmetry between I.R.C. §§ 1398(f)(2) and 1398(I).124
This point, I believe, is the most persuasive offered by the court.
Section 1398(f)(2) provides that the transfer of property (other
than by sale or exchange) from the estate to the debtor upon termi-
nation of the estate is not a taxable event. Section 1398(i) provides
that the debtor succeeds to the estate's tax attributes on termination
of the estate. By allowing the trustee to abandon property, the es-
tate may shift the associated tax liability to the debtor while retain-
ing the enumerated tax attributes that could have been used by the
debtor to offset the amount realized from the subsequent foreclo-
sure. Of course, this is also the result where the property is deemed
abandoned because it was not administered by the trustee. 125
Moreover, any tax attributes not used by the estate will ultimately
revert back to the debtor upon termination of the estate and will be
available to offset taxable income in the year of foreclosure, possi-
bly ameliorating some of the harshness. 126 Nevertheless, fairness
remains an important element of bankruptcy and tax policy. It is
not fair to allow a trustee to abandon property from the estate on
the verge of foreclosure while, at the same time, retain for the es-
tate the tax attributes associated with the very property.
One distinguished commentator seizes upon the lack of sym-
metry as a justification for characterizing abandonment as a taxable
event. 127 Although the Olson model suggests this lack of symmetry,
that conclusion is not inescapable. One could persuasively argue
that if abandonment is congruous to termination under I.R.C.
§ 1398(f)(2), it should also be congruous to termination under
I.R.C. § 1398(i). Thus, when property is abandoned, the tax attrib-
utes listed in I.R.C. § 1398(g) should also remain with the property
to the extent they can be reasonably traced. This is the position
123 See Williams, supra note 52, at 2840.
124 See id. at 273.
125 See 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1994).
126 Accord Shepard, supra note 93, at 74-75.
127 See Lipton, supra note 19, at 14-15.
[Vol. 14
NBRC Tax Recommendations
taken by the IRS in regulations concerning passive activity and at
risk losses and credits. 128
The third reason offered by the Lane court is that abandon-
ment of the property would shift the tax liability from the estate to
the debtor, thus depriving the debtor of a robust fresh start. This is
true. If the estate abandoned the property in our example, and the
lender subsequently foreclosed the lien, then the postpetition tax
would not be dischargeable. The debtor owes the tax. Neverthe-
less, as discussed previously, many tax claims weaken the fresh start
policy. Section 523(a)(1) recognizes that the debtor's fresh start is
subordinate to the government's interest in collecting certain taxes
for its operations, in particular taxes entitled to priority under
Bankruptcy Code § 507(a). 129
One can sense the struggle engaged in by Bankruptcy Judge
Queenan in Lane. The ten million dollar swing in tax liability be-
tween the estate and the debtor forced by the superficial peculiari-
ties of I.R.C. §§ 1398(f)(2) and (i) is patently unfair. Bankruptcy is
a never-ending contradiction between creditor debt-collection activ-
ity and a debtor's discharge. Based on the failure of Congress to
foresee the vagaries associated with mid-stream abandonment,
Judge Queenan struck the balance in favor of the debtor. He de-
nied the proposed abandonment. Thus, in a very real sense, Judge
Queenan fashioned another implied limitation to the power to
abandon property under Bankruptcy Code § 554, a limitation found
nowhere in the language of the statute itself. In that fashion, he has
done nothing more than the Supreme Court did in Midlantic.130 In
fact, there are several similarities between the two opinions. First,
both the fresh start policy limitation in Lane and the environmen-
tally motivated limitation in Midlantic are not supported by the lan-
guage of Bankruptcy Code § 554-they are implied limitations on
the power of abandonment. Second, both of these countervailing
policies are of great force-the former draws its force from the
Bankruptcy Code, while the latter draws its force from state and
federal environmental laws. Third, because the effect of both limi-
tations is to force the estate to retain burdensome or income-
128 SeeTreas. Regs. §§ 1.1398-1(d)(2), 1.1398-2(d)(2).
129 See Shepard, supra note 93, at 75; see also In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir.
1989).
130 National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 393
(1986).
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draining assets, both limitations feed off the priority claimants and
unsecured creditors of the estate, effectively forcing these creditor
classes to subsidize taxing and environmental authorities while al-
lowing a debtor to walk free from the obligations (at least in the tax
context).
Lane generated more questions than it answered. If abandon-
ment is a taxable event, what is the new basis in the property? If the
lender never forecloses on the property, does the debtor receive a
stepped-up basis in the property? If that be the case, is it not un-
fair? Would this not result in a windfall to the debtor? These im-
portant tax questions go unanswered in Lane.
The NBRC recognized that the majority rule under present law
treats debtors unfairly. The debtor is taxed on disposition gain
without the availability of nonexempt assetsto pay the tax. The
debtor does not get the benefit of NOLs and other tax attributes
(other than passive losses and credits) to offset the gain and tax li-
ability. Had property been disposed of prior to bankruptcy, the
debtor would not have suffered either of these adverse conse-
quences. The current minority rule1 31 treats the abandonment as a
taxable event to the bankruptcy estate. This is unfair to taxing
authorities. The tax is an administrative expense and is not a liabil-
ity of the debtor. Therefore, the debtor has effectively turned a
nondischargeable tax into a dischargeable tax. Had the debtor dis-
posed of the property immediately prior to bankruptcy, the tax
would have been a nondischargeable tax. The ABA Task Force
Proposal as modified by the Advisory Committee and the NBRC is
to treat abandonment as a disposition by the debtor immediately
prior to bankruptcy upon the actual transfer by sale or exchange of
the property. To the extent that the tax is not satisfied out of the
bankruptcy estate, the debtor will be responsible. The debtor's per-
sonal tax liability, however, would not arise until there has been an
actual disposition of the asset. This is fair to both the taxing
authorities and the debtor. The taxing authority will be able to re-
cover the tax liability from estate assets. If such assets are insuffi-
cient to pay the liability, the debtor will continue to be responsible.
The debtor will have a nondischargeable tax liability, the same as if
he had disposed of the asset immediately prior to bankruptcy, and
will not have beaten the system by having the gain treated as an ad-
131 By minority rule, I mean the treatment articulated in Lane
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ministrative expense. The unsecured creditors are no worse off
than under the current minority rule, but are worse off than under
the current majority rule. 132 Arguably, under the current minority
rule they have received a windfall, since had the foreclosure taken
place immediately prior to bankruptcy they would have stood in line
behind the taxing authority before receiving any distribution. Thus,
the NBRC adopted with modification the ABA Proposal on aban-
donment outlined above as endorsed by the Advisory Committee.
There were, however, contrary proposals debated by the Advi-
sory Committee. One competing proposal merely codified the ma-
jority rule as outlined in Olson. If property with a tax basis lower
than fair market value remains in the bankruptcy estate at the time
of sale or foreclosure, the resulting capital gains taxes must be
borne by the estate-that is, by unsecured creditors. If, on the
other hand, the property is abandoned to the debtor before sale or
foreclosure (and the abandonment is deemed not to be a taxable
event), the debtor bears the adverse tax consequences upon the ul-
timate disposition of the property. The policy choice presented is
between burdening a debtor's fresh start and burdening the es-
tate/creditors with adverse tax consequences of property that has
no value to the estate. Three primary reasons argue in favor of
leaving the tax burdens with the debtor, rather than the estate.
First is the effect on creditors. It is the debtor who has enjoyed
prepetition use of the property and any tax benefits associated with
the property (depreciation deductions, often accelerated deprecia-
tion for tax shelter investments), so it is only fair that the debtor
bear the tax consequences upon disposition, not creditors. To do
otherwise would require creditors to bear the adverse tax conse-
quences associated with the disposition of property that has con-
ferred no benefit upon the estate. The estate would, in effect, sub-
sidize the debtor as to a postbankruptcy taxable event.
Second is consistency with nontax burdens. If property is bur-
densome to the estate or of inconsequential value to the estate for
nontax reasons (such as environmental problems, title problems,
overencumbrance by liens), the ability of a trustee to abandon
property and thereby protect the estate from postpetition liability is
clear. Property that is burdensome because of adverse tax charac-
teristics (typically, basis less than fair market value) should not be
132 By majority rule, I mean the treatment articulated in Olson.
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excepted from the general rule. Debtors should not get a "tax
fresh start" on such property at the expense of the creditors of the
estate when debtors do not get an "environmental fresh start" or
other type of fresh start for burdensome property.
Third is trustee liability. Trustees are increasingly being
threatened with personal liability or claims against their bonds for
failing to abandon property from the estate prior to foreclosure or
other taxable event triggering capital gains tax liability for the es-
tate. Statutorily clarifying the rule that abandonment of burden-
some property shifts adverse tax consequences to the debtor from
the estate will protect trustees, as well as creditors.
Another competing proposal, put forth by the author, 133 ob-
serves that the majority rule that bankruptcy abandonment is not of
itself a taxable event states the correct view of the law. Thus, a
foreclosure or similar disposition of an asset abandoned by the es-
tate may result in a tax incurred by the individual debtor and not by
the estate. However, under § 1398, tax attributes such as net oper-
ating loss carry forwards have been transferred to the estate and
remain with the estate for estate use even where the tax attributes
are directly related to the abandoned asset. This result is unfair to
the debtor. Taking its cue from the Final Regulations under § 1398,
this Proposal requires that any tax attributes that passed to the es-
tate under § 1398 that may be reasonably traced to the abandoned
property follow the property upon abandonment and may be used
by the debtor. This tracing and allocation of tax attributes does not
require mathematical exactitude; any reasonable method of alloca-
tion should suffice such as the allocation rules for NOLs in regard
to spouses. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of these cases in-
volve single-asset real estate debtors or partners of debtor real es-
tate partnerships where often times one substantial asset comprises
the entire estate, thus making allocation an easier task. Thus, the
debtor does get the benefit of NOLs and other tax attributes to off-
set the gain mid tax liability, and the Proposal alleviates the inequity
associated with the majority rule.
In sum, reasonable minds could disagree on just which ap-
proach is the best. Both the Advisory Committee and the NBRC,
with broad constituencies, favored the modified ABA model of
133 For a detailed discussion of the proposal, see Williams, supra note 52, at 59-63.
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abandonment. I cannot conclude that the adoption of that model is
unjustified.
II. TAX RETURN FILING REQUIREMENTS
Under the I.R.C., an individual earning a gross income that
equals or exceeds the exemption amount and basic deduction gen-
erally must file a federal income tax return. 134 Many states that tax
individual income also require that an individual that must file a
federal income tax return must also file a state income tax return.
Experience and anecdotal evidence suggest that the rate of nonfil-
ers in bankruptcy is high. In studies on chapter 13 cases reported
by James D. Newbold, Special Assistant Attorney General of Illinois,
in the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal,135 a nonifiling rate of
39.5% to 42.3% was discovered in the Northern District of 1i-
nois. 13
6
A. Chapter 13 Tax Return Filing Requirement
The NBRC has adopted the recommendation of the Advisory
Committee on filing return requirements in chapter 13 cases. Assis-
tant Attorney General Mark Browning of Texas (with help from
Steve Csontos of the United States Justice Department) essentially
proposed the framework and drafted what was to become Track
No. 441.137 The Proposal contains several requirements that will
dramatically change the landscape of chapter 13 practice if adopted
by Congress.
First, as a prerequisite for confirming a chapter 13 plan, a
debtor must file tax returns for all tax periods ending within six
years prior to the petition date. 13 8 The requirement for six years of
returns reflects a compromise on the part of tax authorities, who
generally oppose discharge in bankruptcy for any period for which a
134 See I.R.C. § 6012 (1988); see also id. § 63 (standard deduction amounts listed); see id. §
151 (exemption amount listed).
135 See 16 AM. BANKR. INST.J. 12, 12 (October 1997).
136 See id.
137 SeeTAC Report, supranote3, at 32-38.
138 A debtor's written consent to a substitute for return prepared by a tax authority or
written stipulation to a judgment in a nonbankruptcy tax tribunal will constitute a "filed re-
turn" for purposes of this proposal. See id. at 114-15.
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debtor/taxpayer has failed to file returns. 139 Although any time pe-
rinod is arbitrary, a specific requirement that embraces a reasonable
term of years is far superior to an ambiguous standard.
Second, a debtor must properly file prepetition tax returns
with the appropriate tax authorities at least one day prior to the
conclusion of the first meeting of creditors. 140 A debtor will evi-
dence the satisfaction of this requirement by filing with the court a
statement certifying, under penalty of perjury, that all required tax
returns for the relevant periods have been properly filed with the
appropriate tax authorities. The chapter 13 trustee may require
that a debtor submit copies of returns to the trustee. The require-
ment that returns be filed at least one day before the completion of
the § 341 meeting allows a chapter 13 trustee to ask meaningfully
whether the debtor's plan provides for payment of the amount of
taxes reflected in the filed returns. If the proposed chapter 13 plan
does not provide for payment matching the tax shown on the filed
returns, then presumably the trustee would not recommend con-
firmation.
Third, if a debtor has not filed tax returns by the date on which
the first meeting of creditors commences, a chapter 13 trustee may
continue the first meeting to allow additional time to file returns.
Under the Proposal, a chapter 13 trustee may extend the time no
longer than (1) 120 days from the order for relief for returns that
are past due as of the order for relief; or (2) for returns not past
due as of the order for relief date, the latter of (i) 120 days from
the petition date or (ii) the automatic extension date for filing a re-
turn under applicable tax law. This provision in the Proposal also
reflects a compromise on the part of tax authorities and debtors. A
stricter standard requiring tax returns be current as of the date of
the order for relief might delay or deny bankruptcy relief to debtors
who need it for nontax reasons (pending home foreclosure or car
repossession, for example). A looser standard allowing returns to
be filed up until the government claim bar date (180 days from pe-
tition date) would put large-volume tax authorities under an unreal-
139 In response to concerns expressed by debtor and trustee representatives at the NBRC
sessions in Santa Fe and San Diego that requiring an unlimited number of returns to be filed
would discourage bankruptcy nonfilers from "re-entering the system," tax authority represen-
tatives indicated a willingness to compromise on a limited number of years if return filing was
an absolute prerequisite for confirmation and thus, indirectly, discharge. Six years was gener-
ally agreed to be a reasonable period for requiring returns to be filed.
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1994).
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istically short deadline to file or amend claims and would create
havoc or delays in the confirmation process. The anticipated pro-
cedure in cases would be that the trustee would determine at the
initial § 341 meeting if a debtor has filed necessary tax returns. If
not, but the trustee is satisfied that the debtor is making a reason-
able effort to prepare and file returns, the trustee may continue the
§ 341 meeting for up to 120 days or until the last available exten-
sion for a prepetition return. 141
Fourth, a debtor's failure to file timely tax returns by the above
deadline for prepetition returns, or by due dates (including exten-
sions pursuant to applicable tax laws) for postpetition returns, shall
constitute cause for conversion or dismissal under § 1307(c). 142
Rather than automatic dismissal for failure to file tax returns (a po-
sition tax authorities had originally advocated), the Proposal adds
the failure to file returns to the other "causes" for dismissal or con-
version contained in § 1307. Most courts now dismiss or convert
cases when debtors have failed to file tax returns. That practice
would be codified.
Fifth, a court may extend the return filing deadline for good
cause including circumstances for which the debtor should not
justly be held accountable. Dismissal or conversion would be auto-
matic if the extended deadline was missed. This provision of the
Proposal provides a "safety valve" in case a debtor has made a good
faith effort to get returns prepared and filed, but for unanticipated
reasons beyond the debtor's control (delay in receiving necessary
information from tax authorities or incapacitating injury, for exam-
ple) has been unable to do so. Again, this provision is a compro-
mise on the part of tax authorities, whose initial preference was for
an absolute cutoff point for filing returns.
Sixth, the deadline for objecting to plan confirmation shall be
at least sixty days after prepetition tax returns are filed with the tax
authorities. This provision of the Proposal addresses two issues: (1)
how long should tax authorities be given to act upon filed returns;
and (2) can confirmation of a chapter 13 plan proceed before prior-
ity tax debts have been determined. From the perspective of debt-
141 For example, a chapter 13 debtor filing a bankruptcy petition on January 1, 1997
would have the option under tax law of obtaining an extension through August 15, 1997 to file
a 1996 income tax return. Extensions for earlier years would have expired by the petition
date.
142 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307.
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ors and other creditors, problems are created when the entire bank-
ruptcy process must be put on hold while tax authorities determine
what they are owed. The proposed sixty day period would force tax
authorities to act in a reasonably prompt manner to protect their
claims at confirmation. From the tax authorities' perspective, it is a
considerable waste of time and effort either to estimate (and later
amend) claims for tax periods for which no returns have been filed
or to file a "place-holding" confirmation objection until the extent
of the claim is determined. This provision attempts to strike a rea-
sonable balance: debtors must file returns before confirmation can
proceed, but the confirmation process can proceed fairly quickly
after returns are filed.
This provision also seeks to terminate the misguided practice
of confirming chapter 13 plans before the amount of priority tax
debt is known.143 The districts that permit such practice create a
number of complex legal and practical issues. For example, how
can a court fairly assess feasibility of a plan under § 1325(a)(6) if
the amount of priority tax debt that must be paid in full cannot be
determined? Taking a debtor's word for the amount owed, or sim-
ply ignoring the issue, is contrary to reason and common sense.
From a procedural standpoint, confitrnation of a plan before tax
debts are determinable results in a "preliminary confirmation or-
der." Are such orders appealable as final orders? Do they have res
judicata effect on tax creditors, or on other creditors if modifica-
tion is required in the future? Who is responsible for undoing or
modifying the preliminary confirmation order after tax claims are
filed? What is the standard of proof when seeking to overturn or
vacate such orders? Who has the burden of proof?. These unneces-
sary and difficult questions are eliminated under this Proposal.
This provision takes debtors who are delinquent in filing prepeti-
tion returns off the "confirmation fast track" as long as the delin-
quency continues. Debtors who are current on their returns, under
this Proposal, remain on the fast track in jurisdictions that do early
confirmations. Disparate treatment does not seem out of line in
this context because the provision rewards debtors who have com-
plied with the tax laws (or who promptly cure noncompliance) and
delays those who are delinquent. From a procedural and policy
standpoint, more time should be taken to deal with debtors who are
143 For the requirements of chapter 13 conf'imation, see 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
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delinquent filers. Failure to file tax returns is often indicative of
other financial problems that need to be addressed, and the Pro-
posal above would serve to flag potential problem cases needing ex-
tra attention, appropriately taking them off the confirmation "fast
track."
Seventh, a debtor may not file an objection to a proof of
claim 144 for a tax required to be reported on a return unless the
debtor has filed a return for that tax. This is so basic that it needs
no further explanation. Practice in some districts to the contrary is
fundamentally unfair.
Finally, the Proposal would modify the special governmental
bar date145 for tax claims only to allow tax authorities sixty days
from the filing of tax returns by debtors to file proofs of claim;
provided that the modification will not have the effect of shorten-
ing the governmental bar date in any case. As noted above, the
practice of filing estimated "place holding" proofs of claim for pe-
riods for which no returns have been filed creates a number of
problems for tax authorities, debtors, and courts. Tax authorities
must spend considerable time and effort preparing debtor-specific
estimated proofs of claim, which is a monumental task given the
volume of chapter 13 filings. The task is unnecessary if debtors
comply with filing obligations applicable to nondebtors, and the ef-
fort is simply wasted if returns are later filed and processed into
amended proofs of claim, thereby mooting the estimated claims.
Further, tax authorities are in a "no-win" situation on estimated
proofs of claim. Some courts have directed tax authorities to file
claims labeled as estimates to protect their position, while other
courts have sanctioned tax authorities for filing incorrect estimates.
Debtors resent estimated proofs of claim that may overestimate the
amount of taxes owed, and "burden of proof" procedural battles
often erupt in such cases. Courts are faced with hearing claim dis-
putes with a dearth of evidence because debtors have not filed re-
turns. To avoid such difficulties, the Proposal contains a simple
rule: returns must be brought current before debtors can proceed
with claim objections. 146 Consistent with the intent to eliminate
"place-holding" estimated proofs of claim, adjustment to the gov-
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
145 See id. § 502(b)(9).
146 This requirement would not prevent debtors from objecting to audit claims covering
periods for which returns have been filed.
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ernmental claims bar date is proposed allowing the filing of tax
claims based upon the returns filed by debtors rather than upon es-
timates. 147
This Proposal represented months of heated debate and nego-
tiation among members of the Advisory Committee. The Proposal
went through several iterations before it was approved for recom-
mendation by the Advisory Committee and adopted by the NBRC.
If enacted, this Proposal will have far-reaching effect, changing the
face of chapter 13 practice in many districts.
B. Special Court Powers here Debtor Fails to File Retunis
The NBRC also embraced Proposal 700, authorizing a court to
dismiss and enjoin the filing of a subsequent case where a court de-
termines that a chapter 13 debtor is abusing the bankruptcy proc-
ess. Presently, there is a wide variance among districts as to whether
serial filing is a problem. The particular focus of tax authorities is
on chapter 13 repeat filers, although the problem can also occa-
sionally arise in individuals' chapter 11 cases. In some districts, ef-
fective monitoring of "serial filers" by chapter 13 trustees and/or
courts limits the numbers of such cases to minimal levels. In other
districts, it is not uncommon for debtors, particularly small business
debtors, to file four, five, or more cases in a five to ten year span,
incurring substantial new tax debts all the while and without a mate-
rial change in the debtors' circumstances. Such cases expend an in-
ordinate amount of resources of chapter 13 trustees, the court sys-
tem and tax creditors. Some serial filers essentially use the
bankruptcy system as a revolving door through which to duck when
tax authorities undertake collection efforts. Many "serial filers"
have no real hope of ever repaying constantly increasing tax debts
in full, as required by §§ 1322(a)(2) and 1129(a)(9). Bankruptcy
Judge Polly Higdon of Oregon presented data substantiating this
problem at the September 1996 Commission meeting in Santa Fe.
The present Bankruptcy Code provides only limited tools to
creditors, trustees and judges to deal with abusive serial filers.
147 "Filing of returns" presumes returns are property filed - that is, with the right agency,
at the right address, with the right tax identification numbers, with the requisite signatures,
and subject to penalties of perjury/false filing. If not taken up in the context of discussion on
"notice rules," such presumptions may need to be added to this proposal. "Returns" for pur-
poses of this section would include substitutes for return that the debtor has signed and non-
bankruptcy tax tribunal stipulations of liability.
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Bankruptcy Code § 109(g) prevents serial filings only if: (1) a prior
case was dismissed by the court for "willful failure" to abide by
court orders or to appear before the court in prosecution of the
case; or (2) the debtor voluntarily dismissed the case after a credi-
tor's filing of a request for stay relief. Although the case law is split,
some courts have held that the limited circumstances described in
§ 109(e) constitute the only grounds for dismissing a case with
prejudice. 148 Proposal 700 amends §§ 1307 and 1112 to give bank-
ruptcy judges discretion to dismiss cases with prejudice to refiling
under chapter 13 or 11 for a period determined by the court. 149 A
nonexclusive laundry list of relevant factors for courts to consider
in dismissing with or without prejudice would give courts some
guidance, without compelling a result in a particular case. The fac-
tors to be considered include: (1) the number of prior cases filed by
the debtor, (2)the extent to which new debts to creditors, including
tax debts, have accrued during the present case or prior cases,
(3) the good faith, or lack thereof, of the debtor in pursuing plan
confirmation and plan compliance in the pending case or prior
cases, or (4)the reasons why successful completion of prior cases
did not occur.
This Proposal provides courts with the flexibility to keep the
bankruptcy system open to the "honest, but unfortunate" debtor
who suffers job loss, personal injury, or some unforeseen contin-
148 See In re Merrill, 192 B.R. 245, 252 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) ("Although abuse of the
bankruptcy system and creditors by frequent or repeat filers is a well-known problem, Con-
gress has not chosen to combat the problem by authorizing courts to bar abusive debtors from
future bankruptcy relief."). Debtor had filed 7 bankruptcy cases (6 chapter 13's and 1 chapter
7) between 1987 and 1995, incurring substantial additional tax liability during that time. Case
dismissed on motion of state tax authority, but without prejudice to refiling. See also In re
Jones, 192 B.R. 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (quoting Florida Hosp. Trust Fund v. Commis-
sioner, 71 F.3d 808, 813 (1 1th Cir. 1996) ("The Court is persuaded that it cannot deny a debtor
future access to bankruptcy protection except as provided by the Bankruptcy Code.... The
Court understands the frustration of the IRS caused by repetitive filings. But, it is not the role
or power of the judiciary to remedy a legislative statute by opinion. Congress easily can
change the statute whenever it is so inclined."). The Debtor was an optometrist who had filed
three cases in three years, accumulating more than $277,000 of tax debt to the IRS.
149 One way to address the problem of abusive serial filers would be to provide for dis-
missal with prejudice if a certain number of cases have been unsuccessfully attempted within a
certain period of time (no more than three petitions within a five year period). The primary
downside to such arbitrary limits is obvious, however. Not all serial filings are abusive. A
debtor legitimately pursuing chapter 13 rehabilitation may lose his or her job, go through a
divorce, incur a serious personal injury, or face similar uncontrollable circumstances that may
require starting over to achieve a discharge. To avoid inflexibility, but to provide courts the
ability to police abusive filers, a less draconian remedy is possible.
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gency, but would at the same time allow courts to exclude from the
bankruptcy system for a period of time the "revolving door" debt-
ors.
The present American tax system rests on the principle of vol-
untary compliance. One of the central requirements to the volun-
tary system is the filing and reporting of income. Substantial debtor
noncompliance with filing requirements thwarts the system and calls
the integrity of the tax process into question.
Ill. PRIORITY OF LIENS AND CLAIMS
In this section, I discuss the NBRC proposals on the priority
and treatment of tax liens and tax claims. I begin with a short in-
troduction to tax liens and claims in bankruptcy and then turn to
the specific modifications endorsed by the NBRC.
A. The Treatnent of Tax Liens and Claims in Bankruptcy
The Banruptcy Code establishes certain rules and priorities
with respect to the allowance, treatment, and satisfaction of claims.
One of the major modifications of the Bankruptcy Code is the fo-
cus on and characterization of claims. State law generally focuses
on the status of creditors as secured or unsecured. The Bankruptcy
Code, however, focuses on the status of claims. Thus a creditor is
said to have a fully secured claim, an undersecured claim, an over-
secured claim, or an unsecured claim. For example, a creditor who
is owed $100,000 and possesses a lien in collateral worth $75,000
possesses a secured claim for $75,000 (the value of the underlying
collateral) and an unsecured claim for $25,000 (the deficiency).' 50
1. Secured Claims
Although not expressly stated in. the Bankruptcy Code, holders
of secured claims are generally entitled to the collateral or to the
value of the collateral securing their claims. 15 1 Generally, the chap-
ter 7 trustee will surrender the collateral under § 725, abandon the
collateral under § 554, sell the collateral and turn over the proceeds
150 Accord 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
151 See id. § 725.
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under § 363, or allow the creditor to seek relief from the automatic
stay under § 362(d) and repossess and foreclose on the collateral.
A secured claim is allowed for the full amount of the claim, in-
cluding postpetition interest on the claim and possible attorneys'
fees to the extent, but not in excess, of the value of the collateral
securing the claim, but only if the creditor is oversecured. 152 Thus,
if a creditor is undersecured, it will not be entitled to attorneys' fees
or postpetition interest as part of its allowable secured claim.
Like all liens in bankruptcy, the federal tax lien in bankruptcy
is a secured claim to the extent of the value of the collateral and is
an unsecured claim for the debt exceeding the collateral value.153
With a few notable exceptions, the federal tax lien is treated just
like any other secured claim. Taxing authorities possess certain
rights, such as the right of adequate protection under § 361, en-
joyed by generally all secured claims.
The federal tax lien arises upon assessment; however, the tax
lien is a secret lien. The assessment lien is good against the tax-
payer and encumbers all of the property of the taxpayer, even
property exempt under state law and federal tax law.154 However,
the federal tax lien that arises upon assessment does not rank cer-
tain identified parties, including judicial lien creditors. Thus, un-
der § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee who is vested with
the status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor as of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy or, under § 544(a)(3), who is vested with
the rights of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser for value of real
property, will rank the unfiled tax lien.
2. Avoidance of Tax Lien
One noncontroversial Proposal adopted by the NBRC is to
amend 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) to overrule cases that have penalized the
government due to certain benefits for purchasers provided for in
the lien provisions of the I.R.C. Section 6323 of the I.R.C. provides
protection to certain purchasers of property even after a notice of
federal tax lien has been filed in accordance with federal tax law.
I.R.C. § 6323 defines "purchaser" as a person who, for adequate
152 See id. § 506(b); see also Ron Pair v. United States, 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
153 Seeid. § 506(a).
154 Recall that the exempt property under federal tax law is not exempt from the lien, it
is just exempt from levy and distraint.
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consideration, acquires an interest (other than a lien or security in-
terest) in property, which is valid under local law against subsequent
purchasers without notice. Applicable purchases include securities,
motor vehicles, personal property purchased at retail, and personal
property purchased at casual sales. Section 545(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits a trustee to avoid a tax lien that is either not
perfected or not enforceable at the time of the filing of the petition
against a bona fide purchaser, "whether or not such purchaser ex-
ists." Trustees and debtors-in-possession have attempted to employ
§ 545(2) to avoid tax liens on certain of the above-described assets,
on the basis that the trustee or debtor steps into the shoes of the
hypothetical bona fide purchaser entitled to superpriority under the
I.R.C. The purpose of the exceptions in the I.R.C. is to facilitate
the flow of these goods in commerce. Applying § 545(2) to tax liens
may result in an unintended windfall to the debtor. Additionally,
while no reported cases have yet attempted to apply the same legal
arguments to state tax liens with similar provisions, the same legal
argument could be made to penalize state taxing authorities. Thus,
any amendment should not be limited to the federal government
but should also include state and local governments.
3. Subordination of Tax Liens Under § 724
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth special rules con-
cerning the liquidation of a debtor's estate and the treatment of
certain tax liens. Specifically, § 724 deals with the treatment of cer-
tain liens in a chapter 7 liquidation case, including certain penalties
and tax claims. 155 Section 724 requires the partial subordination of
the tax lien to certain priority claims and the complete subordina-
tion of tax penalties secured by that lien whether the lien encum-
bers personal or real property.
Under § 724(a), the trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation case
"may avoid a lien that secures a claim of a kind specified in §
726(a)(4) of this title., 156 The lien referred to in § 726(a)(4) is a
lien that secures a fine, penalty, forfeiture, or punitive damages to
the extent such is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. 157
Accordingly, § 724(a) protects unsecured creditors from the
155 11 U.S.C. § 724.
156 See id. § 724(a).
157 Seeid. § 726(a)(4).
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debtor's wrongdoing by subordinating claims for such penalties to
the claims of other unsecured creditors in a chapter 7 case.15
8
The treatment of certain secured tax claims in a chapter 7 liq-
uidation case is governed by § 724(b). 15 9 Under this subsection, se-
cured tax liens on both real and personal property are subordinated
to the payment of specific identified priority claims. 160 Section
724(b) provides a specific methodology for partial subordination.
The property or the proceeds of the property that are subject to the
valid tax lien are distributed pursuant to § 724(b) in the following
manner:
First, lien claims that are senior to the tax lien are satisfied in ful
pursuant to § 724(b)(1). Moreover, these senior liens cannot be sub-
ject to avoidance under some avoidance power.
Second, pursuant to § 724(b)(2), a distribution is made to the pri-
ority claims under § 507(a)(1) through (a)(7) to the extent of the
amount of the tax lien. In other words, an amount equal to the se-
cured tax claims should be set aside and used to pay the priority
claims. In other words, the taxing authority is fronting the costs of
the bankruptcy. These priority claims may be paid only to the extent
of the claim secured by the tax lien.
Third, § 724(b)(3) provides for a distribution to the secured tax
claimant. The taxing authority will receive proceeds to the extent
158 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 382 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 96 (1978).
159 11 U.S.C. § 724(b), which reads as follows:
Property in which the estate has an interest and that is subject to a lien that is not
avoidable under this title and that .s-cures an allowed claim for taxes, or proceeds of
such property, shall be distributed-
(1) first, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a lien on such property that is
not avoidable under this title and that is senior to such tax lien;
(2) second, to claims specified in sections 507(a)(1), 507(a)(2), 507(a)(3), 507(a)(4),
and 507(a)(5) of this title, to the extent of the amount of such allowed tax claim that
is secured by such tax lien;
(3) third, to the holder of such tax lien, to any extent that such holder's allowed
claim that is secured by such tax lien exceeds any amount distributed under para-
graph (2) of this subsection;
(4) fourth, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a lien on such property that
is not avoidable under this title and that isjunior to such tax lien;
(5) fifth, to the holder of such tax lien, to the extent that such holder's allowed
claim secured by such tax lien is not paid under paragraph (3) of this subsection;
and
(6) sixth, to the estate.
160 124 CONG. REC. H1 1114 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17431 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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the amount of the secured tax claim exceeds the amount distributed
to the priority claimants, that is, the residual, if any.
Fourth, secured claims that are junior to the tax lien are paid pur-
suant to § 724(b)(4).
Fifth, the secured tax claimant is essentially reimbursed for the
fronted cost, that is, the costs of the administrative expense and pri-
ority claims paid under § 724(b)(2).
Sixth, any remaining property is distributed to the estate pursuant
to § 724(b)(6). 161
4. NBRCPrposal on § 724
One topic that generated lively debate among members of the
Advisory Committee and the NBRC is the subordination of tax liens
under § 724 in chapter 7 cases to certain priority claims, including
the administrative expenses, priority wage claims, and priority em-
ployee plan contributions claims. Ultimately, the Advisory Commit-
tee voted six to four to recommend to the NBRC the repeal of
§ 724(b) outright. The four dissenting votes were cast by the four
private bar representatives who were vigorously opposed to any
modification to § 724(b). In the end, the NBRC rejected the rec-
ommendation of the Advisory Committee and adopted an excep-
tion and limitation on the subordination of tax liens in chapter 7.
However, on September 4, 1997, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-
Iowa) preempted the NBRC by introducing S.1149, "The Invest-
ment in Education Act of 1997." One provision of the bill seeks
significant changes to 11 U.S.C. § 724(b).
The Grassley Proposal to amend § 724(b) has garnered recent
steam because of a similar proposal adopted by the NBRC 162 and
an outpouring of support by local tax authorities. 163 Short of an
outright repeal of § 724(b), both S.1149 and the NBRC Proposal
would continue the effect of a partial subordination of a tax lien to
certain designated priority claims,lr4 but exempt from subordina-
161 For an illustration of this methodology, see MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 19, §§
9:38-9:42.
162 NBRC Government Working Group Proposal No. 2: § 724(b).
163 In my capacity as Chair of the Tax Advisory Committee, I received ovcr fifty letters,
calls, faxes, and e-mail messages from local tax authorities and school boards (including my
own high school superintendent) seeking modification of § 724(b).
164 The priority claims include those identified at II U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) through (a)(7). In
particular, administrative expense claims can rank the otherwise unavoidable tax lien in accor-
dance with the rules in § 724(b).
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tion a properly perfected unavoidable tax lien arising in connection
with an ad valorem tax on real or personal property of the estate.
The private bar has generally sought the retention or modest
modification of § 724(b). According to this view, under bankruptcy
law, there is a long-standing policy beginning with the 1938 Chan-
dler Act amendments that has subordinated tax liens to administra-
tive expenses. On each subsequent occasion in which Congress has
revisited the issue, it has broadened the extent of such subordina-
tion. If the bankruptcy system is to be viable, all administrative ex-
penses must be paid. The Bankruptcy Code creates its own set of
priorities, in which administrative expenses are generally superior
to tax claims. In chapter 7 cases, this fundamental structure should
not be nullified because a state legislative body gives itself a tax lien
that results in circumventing the system of priorities created by the
federal Bankruptcy Code.
Nonetheless, the argument against partial subordination of tax
liens under § 724(b) is persuasive. The section is complicated and
obscure, making it difficult to understand and apply. Thus, it is
applied inconsistently or not at all, creating disparate results in dif-
ferent districts. In fact, many trustees ignore the issue unless
pressed, and some embrace the practice of not subordinating ad va-
lorem tax liens already. Furthermore, the section imposes a hard-
ship upon individual debtors because property that would have
been used to pay nondischargeable tax debts, is instead used to pay
otherwise dischargeable claims. Finally, the section places a particu-
lar hardship on local school districts and city/county governments
that may be very dependent on the revenue at risk under § 24(b). 165
Both the NBRC Proposal and S.1149 strike a compromise posi-
tion.166 First, both models retain much of the efficacy of present §
724(b), making the private bar happy. Second, both models require
a trustee to marshal unencumbered assets of the bankruptcy estate
and surcharge secured claims under § 506(c) before seeking subor-
dination under § 724(b). This will make the application of the stat-
ute more complex. But here, the models diverge significantly. The
NBRC Proposal requires a trustee to marshal before subordinating
any tax lien. S.1149 requires a trustee to marshal before subordi-
nating a tax lien "which has arisen by virtue of state law." Under
165 See supra note 159.
166 The Tax Advisory Committee to the NBRC vigorously debated the issues posed by §
724(b) and voted 5 to 4 (with 1 abstention) to repeal § 724(b).
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S.1149, it appears that federal tax liens may be subordinated with-
out a trustee first seeking to marshal unencumbered assets of the
bankruptcy estate. I see no persuasive justification for this differ-
ence.
Another significant difference between the NBRC Proposal
and S.1149 is that S.1149 provides "an exemption to the exclu-
sion." Let us take a minute to unpack what seeks to be new
§ 724(f). This proposed subsection provides that notwithstanding
the exclusion of ad valorem tax liens from partial subordination,
any claim for wages under § 507(a)(3) or for contributions to an
employee benefit plan entitled to priority under § 507(a)(4) may be
paid from property of the estate which secures "a tax lien" in ac-
cordance with § 724(b) so long as the marshaling requirements
identified above have been met. Thus, in some limited circum-
stances, the ad valorem tax lien remains susceptible to partial sub-
ordination to certain wage and employee benefit plan contribu-
tions. At one point, the Government Working Group of the NBRC
entertained the wage and contribution exemption, but the exemp-
tion did not make the final cut.
Both S. 1149 and the NBRC Proposal seek modest modification
to § 724. A bolder stroke is in order. Less complexity, not more, is
called for. I am trobled by the complexities and difficulties posed
by both the S.1149 and NBRC Proposals. However, my experience
in this area has taught me enough to know that many of the com-
plex issues posed by rewrite of § 724 may never be addressed.
Why? Simply, because trustees are going to continue to ignore § 24
unless a simpler and more coherent model is embraced.
B. Unsecured Tax Claims
Unsecured claims arising prior to the filing of the petition are
allowed only to the extent of the amount of the claim as of the date
of filing. Except with respect to fully secured or oversecured
claims, no postpetition interest is allowed on any claim unless a sur-
plus remains after all creditors' claims are paid in full. 167
Claims filed by insiders and attorneys for services rendered to
the debtor are disallowed to the extent that these claims exceed the
reasonable value of services rendered by the parties. An insider of
a corporate debtor includes a director, officer, person in control,
167 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b), 726.
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partnership in which the debtor is a general partner, general partner
of the debtor, a relative of a general partner, director, officer or
person in control of the debtor, or an affiliate. 168 Claims of land-
lords for future rents are limited to any unpaid rent due under the
lease as of the date of commencement of the case and the rent re-
served under the lease for the greater of one year or fifteen percent
(not to exceed three years) of the remaining term of the lease. 169
Not all unsecured claims are on an equal footing. Distributions
in a chapter 7 case are made in accordance with priorities estab-
lished by the Bankruptcy Code. 170 Unsecured claims are placed in
various categories under the following priorities:
1. Administrative expenses of the case as defined in §§ 507(a) and
503.171 These include postpetition tax claims of the estate for
which the debtor may not be liable. 172
2. Claims arising out of authorized postpetition transactions in in-
voluntary cases. 17
3
3. Certain employee claims for wages and attendant payroll taxes
accrued within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing (or cessation
of business) and up to four thousand dollars per claimant.174
4. Certain contributions to employee benefit plans within pre-
scribed statutory limits. 
17 5
5. Certain farmer and fishermen claims up to four thousand dol-
lars per individual claimant. 
17 6
6. Certain deposits in connection with consumer transactions up to
eighteen hundred dollars per claimant.
177
7. Child support and alimony.
17 8
8. Certain tax claims, including (i) income or gross receipt taxes
incurred within three years of the filing of the petition, assessed
within 240 days of the filing, or still assessable after the filing;
168 Seeid. § 101(31).
169 See id. § 502(b)(6).
170 See id. § 726.
171 See id. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(1).
172 See id. § 1398 (1988).
173 See id. § 507(a)(2).
t74 See id. § 507(a)(3).
t75 See id. § 507(a)(4).
176 See id. § 507(a)(5).
177 See id. § 507(a)(6).
178 Seeid. § 507(a)(7).
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(ii) property taxes, within one year of the filing; (iii) employer's
share of employment taxes; (iv) trust fund taxes; (v) excise taxes
within three years of the filing, (vi) custom duties; (vii) certain
tax penalties; (viii) claims for erroneous refunds or credits re-
ceive the same priority level as the tax; and (ix) interest on prior-
ity claims. 17
9
9. Certain FDIC claims.1 8 0
10. Allowed prepetition unsecured claims timely filed. 18 1
11. Allowed prepetition unsecured claims tardily filed. 182
12. Fines and punitive damages. 183
13. Postpetition interest on prepetition claims. 184
The claims described in one through nine are defined as prior-
ity claims under § 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Priority claims
are unsecured claims afforded priority status over other unsecured
claims; as a general rule priority claims do not disrupt secured
claims. The priority scheme delineated in § 726 of the Code and
set forth above provides that unsecured claims are paid in the prior-
ity established above and no claim in a lower class of priority will be
paid prior to payment in full of all claims in a higher class of prior-
ity.
1. Tax Claims Entitled to Priority Treatment
The priority tax claims include the following: (1) involuntary
gap tax claims under § 507(a)(2), 185 (2) income or gross receipts
taxes incurred prepetition and within three years from the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, 18 6 (3) income or gross receipts taxes as-
179 See id. § 507(a)(8).
180 See id. § 507(a)(9).
181 See id. § 726(a)(2).
182 See id. § 726(a)(3).
183 See id. § 726(a)(4).
184 See id § 726(a)(5).
185 The second priority as sct forth in § 50 7 (a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is "unsecured
claims allowed under § 502(f) of this title." Under § 502(f), an involuntary gap claim is one
which arises in the ordinary course of a debtor's business after the filing of an involuntary peti-
tion against the debtor but before either the appointment of a trustee or the entry of an order
for relief. An involuntary gap claim is allowed "the same as if such claim had arisen before the
date of the filing of the petition."
186 An eighth priority is allowed by § 507(a)(8)(A)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code for unse-
cured federal tax liens ("unsecured claims of governmental units") to the extent that such
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claims are for income or gross receipts taxes incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion for which the due date of the tax return (including any extension) occurred within three
years before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed or for which the due date of the return
(including any extensions) occurred after the filing of the petition. As indicated, the due date
of the return, and not the date when the taxes are assessed, determines the priority. See In re
Florence, 115 B.R. 109 (Bankr. S.D.,Ohio 1990)(holding that although the debtor's tax returns
were due and filed more than three years prior to the date of the filing of the debtor's chapter
7 case, the tax claims were nondischargeable because the debtor's assets were under protec-
tion of the bankruptcy court during the debtor's chapter 13 case, for the entire three year pe-
riod prior to the filing of the chapter 7 petition); In re Blackwell, 115 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1990)(holding that a debt for state income taxes more than three years old was dischargeable,
even though the debtor did not file an amended return with the State Department of Taxation
disclosing certain adjustments to the debtor's federal taxable income); In re Smith, 114 B.R.
473 (W.D. Ky. 1989)(holding that the debtor's income tax liability for tax years in which a tax
return was due less than three years before the bankruptcy filing was not dischargeable in the
bankruptcy case, regardless whether such return was timely filed, filed late, or not filed at all).
See also In re Montoya, 965 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1992)(holding that the three year nondischarge-
ability period for unpaid taxes was tolled not just while the automatic stay was in place during
earlier bankruptcy cases, but also during the time the claims were disallowed by the bankruptcy
court based upon the debtor's objections); United States v Cardinal Lines Supply, Ine, 916 F.2d
1087 (6th Cir. 1990)(holding that a priority federal tax claim, which was filed late because the
IRS was not notified and had no knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy case or of any bar date,
was not subordinated to nonpriority unsecured claims); In re Luke, 142 B.R. 160 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1992)(holding that the proper period in determining whether a tax claim is nondis-
chargeable as a priority tax claim is 3 years before the filing of the petition); In re Rassi, 140
B.R. 490 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992)(holding that the appropriate date to consider for the "filing of
the petition" for purposes of calculating the three year period for the dischargeability of tax
debts, was the date on which the original involuntary petition was filed and not the date of
conversion from a chapter 7 to a chapter II case); In re Clark, 138 B.R. 579 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1991)(holding that the debtors' tax return was deemed filed on the date the IRS recorded its
receipt, for dischargeability purposes, rather than the date on which the debtors claimed to
have mailed the return by regular post, absent any proof of postmark by the debtors); In re
Ross, 130 B.R. 312 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1991)(holding that the three year statute of limitations for
tax claim priority is suspended for federal claims until the debtor's assets are no longer under
court control and for six months thereafter); In re Wise, 127 B.R. 20 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1991 )(holding that the three year statute of limitations for determining the tax claim priority
status in the debtor's current chapter 13 case was suspended while the debtor's prior chapter 7
case was pending, plus six months); In re Cassidy, 126 B.R. 94 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)(holding
that a 10% penalty imposed upon the debtor for the early withdrawal of funds from a qualified
retirement plan was a "penalty" and not a "tax" for the purpose of deciding whether it was
entitled to priority); In re Roberts, 125 B.R. 534 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991)(holding that federal tax
penalties relating to tax years 1979 through 1984 would be discharged where the bankruptcy
petition was filed in 1989); In re Bryant, 120 B.R. 983 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990)(holding that a
three year tax priority period was tolled when the debtor filed his first bankruptcy petition and
did not begin to run again until the chapter 7 discharge was granted, for purposes of determin-
ing whether the IRS priority and nondischargeability claims were barred in a subsequent chap-
ter 13 case); In re Cross, 119 B.R. 652 (W.D. Wis. 1990)(holding that the phrase "filing of peti-
tion" for the purpose of determining any income tax obligations for which a return was due
within three years of the filing of the petition, refers to the filing of the original chapter 11
petition and not the conversion from a chapter 11 proceeding to a chapter 7 proceeding).
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sessed within 240 days from the filing of the bankruptcy petition, 187
(4) income or gross receipts taxes still assessable under applicable
law at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, 188 (5) recent prop-
187 Also included are income and gross receipts taxes assessed at any time within 240 days
before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. The 240 day period is extended for the pe-
riod of time an offer of compromise is considered by the IRS after submission by the tax-
payer, plus 30 days after such offer is rejected. Under this rule, the date on which the IRS as-
sesses the tax, rather than the date of the return, determines the priority. See In re Linder, 139
B.R. 950 (D. Colo. 1992)(holding that the I.R.C. provisions tolling the period of time for as-
sessments and the collection of taxes when the taxpayer is in bankruptcy apply to the 240 day
period prior to the bankruptcy filing during which assessed taxes are entitled to priority); In re
Gidley, 138 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)(holding that the debtor's application for an ex-
tension of time to file his 1986 tax return is valid and, therefore, extended the deadline for the
filing of such tax return to within three years of the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition
with the result that the debtor's unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest for the year 1986 were
nondischargeable); In re Blank, 137 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)(holding that the date
the debtor was sent a notice of tax deficiency based upon a second assessment for the debtor's
1985 income taxes, rather than the date of the first assessment for the debtor's 1985 taxes,
controlled for purposes of determining whether the debtor's obligation under the second as-
sessment was entitled to priority and nondischarge); In re Deitz, 116 B.R. 792 (D. Colo.
1990)(holding that the 240 day period of limitations applicable when determining whether an
obligation for income taxes is nondischargeable, was tolled when the debtor filed a chapter 7
petition, and the 240 day period of limitations was extended for an additional six months at
the conclusion of the chapter 7 case); In re Hartman, 110 B.R. 951 (D. Kan. 1990)(holding that
a federal income tax deficiency was "assessed" for bankruptcy dischargeability purposes when
the IRS had taken the necessary steps for the tax liability to attach). See also In re King, 961
F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1992)(holding that California income taxes were "assessed" on the date
that they became "final" which is 60 days after the notice is issued where no protest is filed,
rather than on the date the tax deficiency notices were issued for purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code provision that taxes "assessed" more than 240 days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition are dischargeable); In re King 122 B.R. 383 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990)(holding that under
California law, additional income taxes were "assessed" on the date that they became "final,"
rather than on the date the tax deficiency notices were issued); In re Howell, 120 B.R. 137
(B.AP. 9th Cir. 1990)(holding that taxes assessed within 240 days of the petition date are non-
dischargeable, and those assessed outside of that 240 day period are dischargeable); In re Old-
field, 121 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990)(holding that for purposes of determining whether
federal taxes were dischargeable in bankruptcy as assessed more than 240 days before the pe-
tition was filed, the IRS would be considered to have "assessed" deficient taxes when the IRS
entered onto the debtor's master file that past taxes were due as adjudged by the tax court,
and not when the debtor's tax returns were audited or when the judgment was entered for the
IRS); In reShotwell, 120 B.R. 163 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990)(holding that a tax is "assessed" for the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code provision granting seventh priority to claims for taxes as-
sessed within 240 days prior to the bankruptcy petition, on the date a summary record is signed
by the assessment officer, rather than when the debtor's returns are filed); In re Garm, 114
B.R. 414 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1990)(holding that the IRS "Certificate of Assessments and Pay-
ments" obtained from the IRS under seal of a director of the IRS Center, was self-
authenticating under federal rules of evidence and, thus, no extrinsic evidence proving authcn-
tication was necessary at the time of trial).
188 Section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) grants priority to income and gross receipts taxes not as-
sessed before the filing of a bankruptcy petition, but which are still permitted to be assessed
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erty taxes assessed prepetition and last due without penalty within
one year of the filing, 189 (6) trust fund taxes incurred at any time,190
(7) the employer's share of employment taxes on wages earned
from the debtor and paid before the filing of a bankruptcy petition
to the extent the return for such taxes was last due (including any
extensions of time) within three years before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition or was due after the bankruptcy petition was
filed, 191 (8) excise taxes related to transactions for which a return
under applicable tax laws. Accordingly, a prepetition and ursecured federal tax lien will still
rcceive a seventh priority under this section if the statute of limitations still allows an assess-
ment of the tax liability after the bankruptcy petition is filed, even though such assessment was
not made within the 240 day period (plus any extension) prior to the bankruptcy filing. See also
In re Lemke, 145 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991)(holding that the debtor's state income
taxes were assessable after commencement of the bankruptcy case with the result that the tax
claims in question were entitled to priority status); In re Crawford, 144 B.R. 346 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1992)(holding that the debtors' federal income tax liability was still assessable after
commencement of the bankruptcy case and was, therefore, entitled to priority status).
189 An unsecured claim of a governmental unit for property taxes assessed before the
bankruptcy petition was filed and last payable without penalty within one year before the filing
of the petition is given an eighth priority.
190 Taxes required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable in what-
ever capacity are given an eighth priority under § 507(a)(8)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code. See,
e.g., In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of White Farm Equip. Co., 943 F.2d 752 (7th
Cir. 1991)(holding that a priority claim by the IRS for trust fund taxes in the first chapter 11
case remained a seventh priority claim for trust fund taxes in the debtor's second chapter 11
case, rather than a nonpriority general unsecured claim, despite the contention that the con-
firnation of the first plan discharged such priority claim); In re Cain, 145 B.R. 966 (Bankr. S.D.
Ill. 1992)(holding that the obligation for taxes collected by a chapter 7 debtor retailer was an
Illinois use tax obligation, rather than a retailer's occupation tax debt and, thus, was a nondis-
chargeable trust fund obligation); In re Malcuit, 134 B.R. 185 (N.D. Tex. 1991)(holding that
city and state sales taxes owed by the debtors were trust fund taxes, rather than gross receipts
or excise taxes, and were not dischargeable); In re Peiffer, 126 B.R. 364 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1991)(holding that Alabama sales tax obligations, which the debtor was required to collect and
remit to the state of Alabama, qualified as "trust fund taxes" that were nondishargeable in
bankruptcy rather than "excise taxes" dischargeable after three years).
191 The employer's share of employment taxes on wages earned from the debtor and paid
before the filing of a bankruptcy petition receives a seventh priority under § 507(a)(8)(D) of
the Bankruptcy Code, to the extent the return for such taxes was last due (including any ex-
tensions of time) within three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or was due
after the bankruptcy petition was filed. Older tax claims of this nature are payable as nonprior-
ity general claims. Ukewise, the employee's share of employment taxes on wages earned from
a debtor and paid before the filing of a bankruptcy petition also receives a seventh priority in
the same manner as the employer's share of employment taxes. See, e.g., In re Pierce, 935 F.2d
709 (5th Cir. 1991)(holding that employment taxes on wages earned less than three years be-
fore the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition are entitled to a seventh priority and are
not nondischargeable); In re Continental Minerals Corp., 132 B.R. 757 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1991 )(holding that a claim for unpaid prepetition unemployment compensation contributions
due from the debtor under Nevada law was entitled to priority treatment as an "employment
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(if required) is last due (plus any extension) within three years be-
fore the filing of the bankruptcy petition or due after the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, 192 and (9) certain customs duty under
§ 507(a)(8)(F) of the Bankruptcy Code.193
Priority tax claims are driven by two engines: the first seeks to
protect the tax collector by providing time periods tied to reason-
able collection efforts; 194 the second is tied to debtor miscon-
tax" obligation).
192 Unsecured claims for excise taxes are given a seventh priority under § 507(a)(8)(E) of
the Bankruptcy Code. The excise taxes claimed must relate to transactions for which a return
(if required) is last due (plus any extension) within three years before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition or due after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. If a return is due, the three
year period is extended if the due date for filing the return was extended. 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(8)(E)(1994). If a return is not required, the tax claim must relate to a transaction
which itself occurred within three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. For pur-
poses of this priority, excise taxes covered include sales taxes, estate and gift taxes, gasoline
and special fuel taxes, wagering taxes, and truck taxes. See Williams v Motley, 925 F.2d 741
(4th Cir. 1991 )(holding that the insured motor vehicle assessment imposed by the state of Vir-
ginia upon individuals as a condition for operating uninsured vehicles is an involuntary pecuni-
ary burden levied upon uninsured motorists for proper governmental purposes, and thus such
assessment is nondischargeable as a debt for "excise tax."); In re C-T Va., Inc, 135 B.R. 501
(W.D. Va. 1991)(holding that the IRS's claim of excise tax upon the debtor, equal to 10% of
the assets of the debtor/employer's qualified pension plan which had reverted to such em-
ployer, was not a penalty and was entitled to priority pursuant to the bankruptcy code). See
afso In re C-TOF Va., Inc., 977 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1992)(holding that a tax imposed upon an
employer equal to 10% of the assets of a qualified pension plan, when such assets reverted to
the employer upon the plan's termination constituted an "excise tax" rather than a "punitive
penalty" and, therefore, the tax claim was entitled to priority treatment in the employer's
chapter 11 case); In re The Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir.
1991)(holding that the federal pension excise tax resulting from the debtor's failure to meet
minimum funding requirements for a pension plan was an "excise tax" entitled to priority
rather than a nonpriority "penalty"); In re Suburban Motor Freight, 134 B.R. 617 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1991 )(holding that the obligation for workers' compensation premiums under Ohio law
was an obligation for "excise tax" entitled to priority and distribution; In re C-T Va., Inc., 128
B.R. at 628(holding that the flat 10% fee imposed on assets reverting to an employer upon
termination of qualified employee benefit plans was not in the nature of an "excise tax" or
"pecuniary penalty" but rather a "punitive penalty" and, therefore, not entitled to priority as
an excise tax).
193 Unsecured claims for customs duty are given an eighth priority under § 507(a)(8)(F)
of the Bankruptcy Code. According to the legislative history, this priority covers duties on im-
ports entered for consumption within one year before the filing of the petition, but which are
still unliquidated on the petition date; duties covered by an entry liquidated or reliquidated
within one year before the petition date; and any duty on merchandise entered for consump-
tion within four years before the petition but not liquidated as of the petition date, if the Sec-
retary of the Treasury or his or her delegate certifies that duties were not liquidated because
of possible assessment of antidumping or countervailing duties or fraud penalties.
194 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)- (iii).
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duct. 195 There are several themes that run throughout those tax
claims given priority status. First, any priority claim is inconsistent
with the notion that unsecured claims should be treated with equal
dignity. A compelling argument may be advanced that the tax col-
lector is no more meritorious a creditor than those who provide un-
secured credit that keeps the business going. Professor Marsh,
Chairman of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States established in 1970 ("Commission I"), observed some
thirty years ago:
Should tax claims be granted priority in bankruptcy? Does the tradi-
tional rule which has granted priority to all tax claims, at least over
all general, nonpriority creditors, rest upon anything more than a
naked assertion of power based upon the fact that this particular
creditor happens to be writing the rules of distribution? It is possi-
ble that in a simpler day the priority given to tax claims in insolvency
proceedings was of come real consequences in gathering together
enough funds to keep the government running. There can be no
doubt today that whatever amount the government is able to collect
as a result of such a priority over what it would receive without it is
insignificant; its sacrifice would go completely unnoticed in the vast
federal bureaucracy. It is difficult to see how the government, ab-
sent a plea of necessity, has any equities superior to the other credi-
tors of an insolvent. 196
Professor Marsh may have understated the significance of the
tax collector's interest in bankruptcy returns, especially in a world
of over a million bankruptcy filings a year. Nonetheless, his point is
well taken. Particularly in chapter 7 and 13 cases, to the extent any
estate assets remain after secured creditors are paid, tax claims
gobble up the value. Priority treatment accorded most current taxes
increases the number of "no-asset" cases filed in bankruptcy. Addi-
tionally, the many no payment or nominal payment chapter 13 plans
are no or nominal payment plans precisely because the priority tax
claims tap the unencumbered value of the estate. The favored
treatment accorded tax claims also increases general creditor disen-
chantment with the entire bankruptcy process. The priority status
accorded tax claims as opposed to other claims that are a cost of
195 See, e.g., id. § 507(a)(8)(c).
196 Harold Marsh, Jr., Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42
WASH. L REV. 681, 729 (1967)(footnote omitted).
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doing business or involve nonconsensual creditors reflects a gov-
ernment bent on protecting itself from the laws it enacts. Such an
approach tends toward hypocrisy and deserves careful reconsidera-
tion.
Second, Congress is concerned that bankruptcy not become a
tax haven. Of course, this point speaks most directly to discharge-
ability and not priority of a tax claim. But here one witnesses an in-
teresting interdependency. To the extent a tax claim is both a pri-
ority and a nondischargeable claim, its priority status ensures some
dividend that then redounds to the benefit of a debtor faced with
an appealing reduction in the nondischargeable claim. Nonethe-
less, priority status harms marginal reorganization efforts because
of the requirement that § 507(a)(8) priority tax claims be paid in
full over six years from assessment 97 and reduces the ultimate
dividend received by the unsecured creditors.
These two conflicting interests-concern that the tax collector
locks out equally worthy and more vulnerable unsecured creditors
and fear that bankruptcy becomes the preferred tool for tax protes-
tors and cheats-are not easily reconciled. In fact, they cannot be
reconciled in a coherent manner. The choice between the two
competing policies is driven by nothing other than politics.
2. Proposed Amendments to Adminisrattive Tax Provisions
The NBRC has recommended a series of amendments to alle-
viate the difficulty taxing authorities have had in collecting post-
petition administrative taxes. First, the NBRC recommended
amendment to § 503 and 28 U.S.C. § 960 to eliminate the need for
a governmental unit to make a "request" to the debtor to pay tax
liabilities that are entitled to payment as administrative expenses.
Because governmental units are creditors in the vast majority of
bankruptcy cases, this issue has been a real problem for taxing
authorities.
Second, the NBRC recommended amendment to §§ 502(a)(1)
and 503(b)(1)(B) to provide that postpetition ad valorem real estate
taxes should be characterized as administrative expenses whether
secured or unsecured and such taxes should be payable as ordinary
course expenses. The treatment of postpetition ad valorem real es-
197 Seell U.S.c. § 1129(a)(9)(c).
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tate taxes in bankruptcy has posed substantial problems for local
taxing authorities. The Proposal suggests that these taxes should be
treated as administrative expenses, whether secured or unsecured,
and should be paid in the ordinary course of the debtor's affairs. 198
Third, the NBRC recommended overruling Investors of The Tri-
angle v. Carolina Triangle Ltd. Partnership (In re Carolina Triangle Ltd.
Partnership),199 and to ensure that postpetition ad valorem real es-
tate taxes are a reasonable and necessary cost of preservation of the
estate. The NBRC has adopted the recommendation of the Advi-
sory Committee that postpetition ad valorem real estate taxes are a
reasonable and necessary cost of preserving the estate and are enti-
tled to treatment as administrative expenses payable in the ordinary
course of affairs of the debtor. Cases that provide to the contrary
should be overruled.
Fourth, the NBRC has adopted the recommendation of the
Advisory Committee that postpetition ad valorem real estate taxes
are incurred by the estate and are a reasonable and necessary cost
of preserving the estate and are entitled to treatment as administra-
tive expenses payable in the ordinary course of affairs of the
debtor. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to estab-
lish that ad valorem taxes are incurred by the estate and, therefore,
are entitled to administrative expense priority status.
3. Proposal Regarding Deadline by which Priority Tax Claim Must be
Filed
The NBRC has sought to clarify § 726(a)(1) to provide that a
taxing authority must file a claim for a priority tax before the final
order approving the trustee's report is entered by the court. In
chapter 7, § 726(a)(1) allows a tardily filed claim for a priority tax if
the claim is "filed before the date on which the trustee commences
distribution." One court held that the date the trustee commences
distribution is the date when the court approves the final report and
accounting of the trustee.200 The court rejected the State of Mis-
souri's argument that the date the trustee commenced distribution
198 The proposal is not intended to overrule the limitation on paying property taxes im-
posed by § 502(b)(3) (prohibiting the payment of a tax assessed against property if the claim
exceeds the estate's interest in the property).
199 166 B.R. 411 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
200 See In reWilson, 190 B.R. 860 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996).
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was the date the checks were mailed and rejected the trustee's ar-
gument that distribution commenced when the trustee's final report
was sent to the United States Trustee for approval. The NBRC has
adopted the recommendation of the Advisory Committee that the
language to § 726(a)(1) be changed from "the date on which the
trustee commences distribution" to "the date on which the court
approves the final report and accounting of the trustee." This Pro-
posal is a housekeeping amendment designed to minimize future
litigation that may arise from a literal reading of the statute.
4. Tolling of Time Periods to Preserve Priority Status
The NBRC has adopted a recommendation of the Advisory
Committee to amend §§ 507(a)(8) and 523(a)(1) to provide for the
tolling of relevant periods in the case of successive filings. Thus, in
the event of successive bankruptcy filings, the time periods speci-
fied in § 507(a)(8) shall be suspended during the period in which a
governmental unit was prohibited from pursuing a claim by reason
of the prior case. Several tax claims that are identified in the Bank-
ruptcy Code as priority claims or as claims that are nondischarge-
able are tied to certain time limits. For example, tax claims as-
sessed within 240 days of the filing of the petition are priority
claims under § 507(a)(8) and nondischargeable under § 523(a)(1).
When the debtor has filed successive bankruptcy petitions, the issue
posed is whether the first filing tolled the running of these time pe-
riods, thus maintaining the priority and nondischargeable character
of the tax claims in the subsequent bankruptcy case.
The NBRC has adopted the recommendation of the Advisory
Committee that in the event of successive bankruptcy filings, the
time periods specified in § 507(a)(8) shall be suspended during the
period in which a governmental unit was prohibited from pursuing
a claim by reason of the prior case. A debtor should not be entitled
to stay the collection of a tax by filing a bankruptcy petition and
then benefit from the pendency of the abortive case by reducing or
eliminating the time in which the government's tax claims would
otherwise have been entitled to priority, or altering the nondis-
chargeability of a tax. Clarification of the law would eliminate un-
necessary litigation and provide uniformity in the law.20 1
201 Compare In re Waugh, 1997 W.L 135626 (8th Cir. Mar. 26, 1997); West v. United
States, 5 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Richards, 994 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1993); Montoya v.
[Vol. 14
NBRC Tax Recommendations
The NBRC also supported a recommendation by the Advisory
Committee to amend § 507(a)(8)(ii) to toll the 240 day assessment
period for both pre- and post-assessment offers in compromise.
Under current law, income or gross receipts taxes that are assessed
within 240 days of the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed are
entitled to an eighth priority.20 2 If an offer in compromise is made
by the taxpayer within 240 days of the assessment date, the time
during which the offer in compromise was outstanding plus 30 days,
is added to the 240 day period. This mirrors the reality that during
a pending offer in compromise, the IRS refrains from taking collec-
tion action. In United States v. Aber4203 the court held that the 240
day period is not suspended for offers in compromise made before
the assessment date for those taxes. This Proposal speaks directly
to some of the problems posed by pending offers in compromise.
The NBRC has adopted the recommendation of the Advisory
Committee that any offer in compromise pending within the 240
day period should toll that period whether the offer in compromise
was made before or after assessment. The Proposal removes an ar-
bitrary distinction between assessments that could have been made
within days of each other.2°4
5. Subordination of Tax Penalties
The NBRC also addressed the highly controversial issue of
whether payment of prepetition nonpecuniary loss tax penalties in
chapter 11, 12, and 13 cases should be subordinated to payment of
general unsecured claims. The payment of prepetition tax penalties
in chapter 11, 12, and 13 cases should be subordinated to payment
of general unsecured claims without a requirement of a finding of
governmental misconduct. Granting a priority to penalties works an
unfairness on general unsecured creditors by, in effect, punishing
them for the debtor's misconduct. This is inequitable, especially
United States, 965 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Brickley, 70 B.R. 113 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986)
(all tolling the § 507(a)(8) time periods), with In re Quenzer, 19 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1993); In re
Gore, 182 B.R. 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995). There was no consensus among members of the
Advisory Committee on whether I.R.C. § 6503(h) provides a reasonable tolling mechanism that
should be expressly applied to tax claims under §§ 507(a)(8) and 523(a)(1), or whether the
more appropriate additional period is the 30 day period in § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994).
203 78 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 1996).
204 This proposal does not extend to installment agreements as urged by the IRS.
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when creditors have limited access and ability to monitor a tax-
payer's compliance with tax reporting requirements. 20 5
IV. DISCHARGE
In filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, an individual's
most important objective is a discharge from debts. The discharge
is the heart of the fresh start policy promoted by the Bankruptcy
Code. The discharge is granted virtually automatically unless an ob-
jecting party can establish that the debtor has engaged in certain
prohibited conduct, usually some type of fraud or bankruptcy
crime.206 The objecting party has the burden of establishing a
ground for the denial of a discharge. 20 7
A discharge in a bankruptcy case voids any judgment to the ex-
tent that it is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor
with respect to a prepetition debt.208 The discharge also operates
as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an
action, the employment of process, or any act, including telephone
calls, letters, and personal contacts, to collect, recover, or offset any
discharged debt.20 9 In effect, the discharge is a total prohibition on
debt collection efforts against the debtor. Furthermore, under §
524 of the Code, any attempt to reaffirm a particular debt is void
unless the particular provisions of the Code delineating the re-
quirements of reaffirmation are specifically followed. 210
Under § 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court
must grant the individual debtor a discharge of prepetition debts
unless one of ten conditions is met.211 Only an individual is eligible
205 The prepetition, nonpecuniary loss penalties of all creditors, including tax authorities,
are subordinated to the claims of general unsecured creditors in a chapter 7 case, pursuant to
§ 726(a)(4). However, the Supreme Court has correctly found that outside of a chapter 7 liq-
uidation context, prepetition tax penalties cannot be categorically subordinated to the claims
of general unsecured creditors.
206 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
207 If a debtor has been denied a discharge in a bankruptcy case, so that all his debts re-
main outstanding, the debtor may not include the same obligations in a subsequent case to ob-
tain a discharge. The denial of the discharge is resjudicata as to the obligations existing at that
time, which are forever nondischargeable.
208 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).
209 See id.
210 See generallyid. § 524(c).
211 Not all debtors are entitled to a discharge under § 727(a) of the Code. The right to
discharge is a right reserved for the honest debtor. Over-extending oneself, unforeseen con-
tingencies, the inability to pay debt, or lack of business acumen are not reasons to deny a
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for a discharge under chapter 7 pursuant to § 727(a); a partnership
or corporation may not receive a discharge under chapter 7. Addi-
tionally, § 727(a) applies only in liquidation cases under chapter
7. 2 12 The scope of the chapter 7 discharge is quite broad. Any debt
that arose prior to the entry of the order for relief is discharged. 213
Under § 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the confirmation of
the plan of reorganization discharges the debtor from any debt that
arose before the confirmation of the plan. Unlike § 727(a), a part-
nership or corporation (as well as an individual) may receive a §
1141(d) discharge. The § 1141(d) discharge is broader than the §
727(a) discharge in that the latter discharges any debts that arose
before the entry of the order for relief, while the former discharges
any debts that arose before the confirmation of the plan.
Nevertheless, there are limits to the § 1141 (d) discharge. First,
debts excepted from discharge under § 523 are not discharged un-
der § 1141(d) when the debtor is an individual. Second, if the plan
provides for liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of
the estate, the debtor does not continue in business, and the debtor
would be denied a discharge under § 727(a), then confirmation of
the plan does not discharge the debtor. These limitations are nec-
essary so that an individual debtor may not employ a chapter 11 liq-
uidation plan to evade the objections to discharge embodied in
§§ 523(a) and 727(a).
Unlike chapter 11, the chapter 13 discharge is granted, not at
confirmation, but after the debtor has completed performance un-
der the chapter 13 plan. Under § 1328(a) almost all debts of the
debtor are discharged, even those that are nondischargeable under
§ 523(a). Consequently, the chapter 13 discharge is broadest in
scope. As a matter of fact, the only debts that survive the chapter
13 discharge are alimony and support payments, student loans un-
debtor's discharge. But fraud, criminal activity, and misconduct are. If a creditor or the trus-
tee is successful in attacking the debtor's discharge under § 727(a), then all claims survive the
bankruptcy case and may be enforced and ultimately satisfied. Grounds for denial of a dis-
charge under chapter 7 include: (1) the debtor is not an individual; (2) a transfer or conceal-
ment of property within one year of bankruptcy by the debtor with the intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud its creditors; (3) the debtor's failure to keep adequate financial records; (4) debtor
misconduct during the bankruptcy case, including perjury, false statements, false oaths, or
failure to obey a court order;, (5) a debtor's inability to satisfactorily explain any losses or defi-
ciencies of assets; or (6) a chapter 7 discharge within six years of the commencement of the
pending case.
212 See 11 U.S.C. § 103.
213 See id. § 727(b).
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less failure to discharge would create an undue hardship, criminal
fines, claims arising from driving under the influence, criminal res-
titution, and certain long term debts that the plan purports to pay
out after the plan.214
A. Exceptions of Debt from Discharge
Notwithstanding the debtor's discharge under the Bankruptcy
Code, certain debts are excepted from discharge as a matter of
public policy pursuant to § 523(a). These exceptions to discharge
are strictly construed. An exception to discharge should be con-
trasted with an objection to discharge. If successful in an objection
to discharge proceeding, the creditor's claim along with every other
claim survives the bankruptcy case; that is, the debtor will not re-
ceive a discharge at all. It is significantly different with an excep-
tion to discharge proceeding under § 523(a). If successful in assert-
ing § 523(a), the creditor's claim will not be discharged and will
survive the bankruptcy case; that is, a § 523(a) claim may be en-
forced and ultimately satisfied even after the bankruptcy case.
Thus, although the debtor receives a general discharge, the § 523(a)
claims live on.
The burden of proof to assert that the debt is nondischarge-
able under § 523(a) falls squarely on the shoulders of the creditor
asserting the exception. 215 Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code
specifies which debts of an individual debtor are not discharged in a
bankruptcy case under § 727 of chapter 7, § 1141 of chapter 11, or
§ 1328(b) of chapter 13 (the "hardship discharge). 216 Included
among theses debts are certain taxes which are identified as nondis-
chargeable. 217 The following taxes are excepted from discharge
214 A chapter 13 debtor who fails to complete payments under the chapter 13 plan for
reasons beyond the debtor's control may nevertheless be granted a "hardship" discharge. This
hardship discharge is granted so long as the creditors have received as much under the plan as
they would have under a chapter 7 liquidation. In effect, the hardship discharge is nothing but
a chapter 7 discharge under a different guise. Thus, all the debts that are nondischargeable
under § 523(a), which could have been discharged pursuant to completion of the chapter 13
plan, will remain in full force and effect like in a chapter 7 case.
215 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), 507(a).
216 However, these taxes may be discharged in a chapter 13 under § 1328(a), that Is, the
chapter 13 superdischarge.
217 In In re Olson, 123 B.R. 312 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991), the bankruptcy court held that a
nondischargeable tax claim survives bankruptcy regardless of whether such claim was filed or
allowed in the bankruptcy case.
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under § 523(a): (1) taxes entitled to priority under §§ 507(a)(2) and
(a)(8), (2) taxes connected with fraudulent returns, late returns, or a
failure to file returns, or taxes associated with a willful attempt to
evade or defeat a tax, and (3) governmental fines and penalties to
the extent that they are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
Nonetheless, this third category of nondischargeable debt does not
include tax penalties relating to dischargeable taxes or to any trans-
action or event that occurred more than three years before the fil-
ing of the bankruptcy petition.
B. Tax Claims not Subject to Discharge in Chapter 7 or 11 Cases
Section 523(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the taxes
or customs duties that are not dischargeable by an individual debtor
in a chapter 7, 11 or 13 bankruptcy case under §§ 727, 1141 or
1328(b) (chapter 13 "hardship discharge"), respectively. However,
the regular chapter 13 super-discharge does discharge debts
(including tax claims) identified under § 523(a).
The first category of nondischargeable tax claims is set forth in
§ 523(a)(1)(A). 218 Under this section, a tax or customs duty speci-
fied in §§ 507(a)(2) as an involuntary gap claim 219 or 507(a)(8) 220 as
a priority claim is nondischargeable whether or not a claim for such
tax was allowed by the court or filed in the case. 221 These priority
and nondischargeable tax claims were identified above.222
218 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), which reads as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt-
(1) for a tax or a customs duty-
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(6)
of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was Filed or allowed;
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed; or
(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was last due, under applicable
law or under any extension, and after two years before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully at-
tempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax.
219 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A); id. § 507(a)(2)(this section relates to the priority of in-
voluntary gap claims).
220 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)(A); id. § 507(a)(6) (this section relates to the priority of al-
lowed unsecured tax claims of governmental units).
221 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)(A). See also, e.g., In re King, 19 BRW 936 (Tenn. 1982)
(holding that abandoned coal mine reclamation fees charged by the Federal Surface Mining
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The second category of nondischargeable tax claims is set forth
in § 523(a)(1)(B) and (C) and includes the following taxes: (1) tax
liabilities relating to a tax return which was not filed, 223 (2) tax li-
abilities reported by a tax return filed late and filed within two years
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition or filed after the bank-
ruptcy petition, or (3) tax liabilities reported by a fraudulent re-
turn224 or from an attempt by the debtor to willfully evade or defeat
any tax.2 2 5
Act are excise taxes under § 507(a)(6)(E) and are therefore nondischargeable under §
523(a)(1) against individual debtors in a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 185-93.
223 See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 949 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1991)(holding that the term "Filed
return" was not broad enough to include a substitute return prepared by the IRS, absent the
debtor's signature thereon); In re Grynberg, 142 B.R. 415 (D. Colo. 1991)(holding that gift
taxes owed by the chapter 11 debtors were nondischargeable because the debtors failed to ile
any gift tax return); In reArenson, 145 B.R. 310 (D. Neb. 1992)(holding that the debtor's iling
of amended federal income tax returns for prior tax years for which no returns had been iled,
did not constitute the filing of "returns" which would prevent the discharge of the tax debt for
the years in question); In re Berzon, 145 B.R. 247 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1992) (holding that a chap-
ter 7 debtor's federal tax obligations were nondischargeable because the debtor failed to file
tax returns); In reArenson, 134 B.R. 934 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1991)(holding that a debtor's federal
income tax liabilities were not dischargeable for years in which he did not file tax returns);
United States v D'Avanza, 132 B.R. 462 (M.D. Fla. 1991)(holding that the debtor's late-mailed
federal income tax return was not "iled" for dischargeability purposes, when the return was
not received by the IRS); In re Gushue, 126 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991)(holding that nei-
ther substitute returns filed on behalf of a chapter 7 debtor by the IRS nor a stipulated deci-
sion settling a dispute with the IRS, qualified as a "return" under the Bankruptcy Code provi-
sion indicating that discharge does not discharge a debt for a tax for which a required income
tax return was not filed); In re Chastang, 116 B.R. 833 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)(holding that the
debtor's liabilities for federal income taxes for which the debtor failed to file returns were
nondischargeable even though the IRS had prepared substitutes for the returns); In re Craw-
ford, 115 B.R. 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990)(holding that a tax obligation for which the debtor
did not ile a tax return is nondischargeable even though the IRS filed the return on the
debtor's behalf); In re Brookman, 114 B.R. 769 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)(holding that the debt
for unpaid income taxes was nondischargeable because the debtor failed to rebut prima facie
evidence that the tax return for the applicable tax year was not filed); In re Pruitt, 107 B.R. 764
(Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989)(holding that substitute tax returns Filed by the IRS when the debtor
failed to file such returns for several years did not preclude application of the Bankruptcy
Code rendering tax debts nondischargeable for any tax debt with respect to which a return was
required and not filed).
224 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B) and (a)(1)(C); see also 124 CONG. REC. 32362 (1978); 124
CONG. REC. 22998 (1978); In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. 1992)(holding that a United
States Tax Court judgment holding the debtors liable for income tax deficiencies resulting
from fraudulent tax returns did not have claim preclusion or issue preclusion effect in deter-
mining whether the debtors' liability was nondischargeable); In re Levinson, 969 F.2d 260 (7th
Cir. 1992)(holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a determination that the debtor
had filed fraudulent tax returns so as to render the tax debts nondischargeable); In re Hopkins,
133 B.R. 102 (Bankr. M.D. Ohio 1991)(holding that the wife's signing of joint returns which
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The third category of nondischargeable taxes is set forth in
§ 523(a)(7). 226 This section provides that tax penalties that are pu-
nitive in nature are nondischargeable only if the penalty is com-
puted by reference to a related tax liability that is also nondis-
chargeable. It appears that if the amount of the penalty is not
computed by reference to a tax liability, the transaction or event
giving rise to the penalty must occur during a three year period end-
ing on the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
22
However, in In re Burns2 28 and In re Roberts,229 the Eleventh and
Tenth Circuits respectively held that a tax penalty is discharged if
the tax to which it relates is discharged or if the transaction or event
giving rise to the penalty occurred more than three years prior to
she knew were in error constituted the making of a fraudulent return or willfully attempting to
evade such tax and, thus, such tax debts were nondischargeable in the wife's bankruptcy case);
In re Peterson, 132 B.R. 68 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991)(holding that the debtor did not "willfully"
attempt to evade tax by signing returns which the government admits were not fraudulent and
then filing for relief under chapter 7 shortly after such taxes became eligible to be discharge-
able); In re Gilder, 122 B.R. 593 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)(holding that when the debtor submit-
ted false withholding statements for the express purpose for eliminating the withholding of
federal income taxes from wages, such conduct was a "willful attempt to evade or defeat tax"
within the meaning of the exception to discharge); In re Carapella, 115 B.R. 365 (N.D. Fla.
1990)(holding that the tax liability of a chapter 7 debtor for a fraudulent return filed by the
debtor was nondischargeable); In re Kirk, 114 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990)(holding that the
debtors' conduct demonstrated a purposeful attempt to evade income taxes and thus, the
claim of the IRS for civil fraud penalties was allowed); In re Fernandez, 112 B.R. 888 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1990)(holding that the debtor's conduct concerning tax obligations was shown to be
willful and evasive and thus, the tax obligations were deemed nondischargeable); In re Gra-
ham, 108 B.R. 498 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)(holding that a prepetition tax court decision holding
the debtor liable to the IRS for the debtor's underpayment of taxes, but which did not decide
that the underpayment was fraudulent, did not preclude the debtor from disputing the gov-
ernment's claim that such tax liabilities were nondischargeable for fraud).
225 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).
226 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), which reads as follows:
(a) A discharge under Section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt-
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and
for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pe-
cuniary loss, other than a tax penalty-
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (I) of this subsection;
or
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before three
years before the date of the filing of the petition.
227 See 124 CONG. REC. 32362 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 33998 (1978). See also Rev Rul 68-
574, 1968-2 CB 595.
228 887F.2d 1541 (lthCir. 1989).
229 906 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1990).
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the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Moreover, in In re Hender-
son,230 the bankruptcy court held that tax penalties relating to non-
dischargeable tax liabilities incurred more than three years before
the filing of a bankruptcy petition were dischargeable in a chapter 7
case. Furthermore, in In re Fullmer,231 the Tenth Circuit held that
tax penalties imposed pursuant to nondischargeable tax debts are
nondischargeable as well. Likewise, in McKay v. United States,232 the
Ninth Circuit held that civil fraud penalties imposed on unpaid
taxes accruing more than three years before the filing of the
debtor's bankruptcy petition were dischargeable, even though the
debt for unpaid taxes was not dischargeable on the ground of
fraud.
With respect to individual debtors in reorganization under
chapter 11, § 1141(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code incorporates by
reference the exceptions to discharge set forth in § 523 and dis-
cussed above. 233 Section 1141(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt excepted from discharge under
§ 523.234
With respect to all debtors (including corporations and part-
nerships), the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan does not discharge
the debtor from any debts (including taxes) if: (1) the plan provides
for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the
estate, (2) the debtor does not engage in business after consumma-
tion of the plan, and (3) the debtor would be denied a discharge
under § 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if the case were a chapter 7
liquidation proceeding.235
Thus, a debtor is not discharged from any debt (including fed-
eral taxes) by the confirmation of a plan if the plan is a liquidation
plan and if the debtor would be denied a discharge in a chapter 7
liquidation proceeding pursuant to § 7 27(a) of the Bankruptcy
230 137 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1991).
231 962 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
232 957 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1992).
233 See 124 CONG. REC. 32362 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 33998 (1978).
234 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(d)(2) and 523 (1994).
235 See id.§ 1141(d)(3).
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Code.236 Under § 727(a)(1), only an individual, and not a corpora-
tion or a partnership, may obtain a discharge. 237
C. Tax Claims in Chapter 13 Cases
After a debtor has made all payments required by the chapter
13 plan, the bankruptcy court grants to the debtor a discharge of all
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under § 502, except
the following debts: (1) debts with the final payment falling due af-
ter the final payment under the plan is due as set forth in §
1322(b)(5), that is, certain long-term debt;23 8 (2) debts owed to a
spouse, former spouse, or child for alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or
property settlement agreement as set forth in § 523(a)(5); 239 (3) cer-
tain student loans that do not pose an undue hardship to the debtor
as set forth in § 523(a)(8); (4) debts for death or personal injury
caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated as set forth in § 523(a)(9); and (5) debts for restitution in-
cluded in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.240
Thus, § 1328 discharges most of the debts listed in § 523(a)
that may not otherwise be discharged in a chapter 7 or chapter 11
case. Included in those debts discharged in a chapter 13 case are
the tax claims identified in § 523(a)(1). However, all priority claims
under § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code must be paid in full pursuant
to the chapter 13 plan, including various kinds of taxes under §
507(a)(8) as discussed above. In addition, § 1328(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that the bankruptcy court may revoke a dis-
charge if it had been obtained through fraud, provided the request
for revocation is made within one year after the discharge is
granted. 241
The chapter 13 discharge is much broader in scope than either
the chapter 7 or chapter 11 discharge. Recall that under chapter 7
or chapter 11 (when the debtor is an individual), a creditor who
persuades the court to except its debt under § 523(a) of the Bank-
236 See S. REP. No. 95-989 at 129, rep rinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3787 (1978).
237 See I1 U.S.C. §727(a)(1).
238 See id. § 1328(a)(1).
29 See id. § 1328(a)(2).
240 Seeid. § 1328(a).
241 Seeid.§ 1328(e).
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ruptcy Code may disregard any discharge order and enforce its
claim even after discharge or plan confirmation. This is not true in
the chapter 13 case. Under § 1328(a), almost all debts are dis-
charged, even those that are nondischargeable under § 523(a).
Consequently, chapter 13 may be a more useful tool for the debtor
who has a substantial amount of debt that a court may find nondis-
chargeable under § 523(a), like tax debts.
What happens to the chapter 13 discharge if a debtor is unable
to complete performance under the plan? Section 1328(b) of the
Code answers this question. If the chapter 13 debtor cannot per-
form under the plan due to reasons beyond the debtor's control,
the debtor may receive a "hardship" discharge so long as the debtor
has performed sufficiently to ensure that the creditors have re-
ceived more under the chapter 13 plan as partially performed than
they would have received under a chapter 7 liquidation. Nonethe-
less, the Code extracts a price from the chapter 13 debtor who by
powers beyond the debtor's control must resort to the hardship dis-
charge. A discharge granted under this subsection discharges the
debtor from all unsecured debts provided for by the plan or disal-
lowed under § 502 except claims with final payments falling due af-
ter the final payment under the plan is due as set forth in
§ 1322(b)(5); 24 2 and debts as specified in § 523(a). 243 Thus, those
§ 523(a) debts that are generally nondischargeable but would have
been discharged under chapter 13 remain nondischargeable if the
debtor is granted the hardship discharge. 244 In other words, the
chapter 13 hardship discharge is but the chapter 7 discharge in a
different guise.
Since the chapter 13 discharge discharges "all debts provided
for by the plan," the critical issue is frequently the interpretation of
the phrase "provided for by the plan," and, in the tax area, the abil-
ity of the chapter 13 debtor to discharge § 507(a)(2) and (a)(8) pri-
ority tax claims even though such claims may have been "provided
for" in the debtor's plan, but not actually paid. Suppose, for exam-
242 See id. § 1328(c)(1).
243 Seeid. § 1328(c)(2).
244 Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code specifies certain taxes which are deemed non-
dischargeable in connection with a § 1328(b) hardship discharge. These nondischargeable
taxes include federal taxes given a second priority as involuntary gap claims under § 507(a)(2),
unsecured tax claims of governmental units under § 507(a)(7), tax liabilities relating to a tax
return which was not filed, tax liabilities reported by tax returns filed late or filed after the
bankruptcy petition, tax liabilities reported by fraudulent returns, and certain tax penalties.
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pie, that the debtor's chapter 13 plan provides that the debtor will
"pay one hundred percent of allowed priority claims to the IRS."
Suppose further that the IRS receives a timely notice of the debtor's
chapter 13 plan, however, the IRS does not file its proof of claim in
a timely manner, and the IRS is legitimately owed a designated
amount of prepetition taxes which qualify as a priority unsecured
claim under § 507(a)(8). Upon consummation of the debtor's
chapter 13 plan, are the prepetition priority taxes owed to the IRS
discharged?
It is clear that § 1322(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that a plan must provide for the full payment in deferred cash pay-
ments of all § 507(a)(8) priority claims, including tax claims. In the
example as stated above, however, there is authority to support the
debtor's position that the debtor will be discharged from the prepe-
tition priority taxes owed to the IRS because the taxes were
"provided for" under the debtor's plan combined (fortunately, for
the debtor) with the lack of diligence by the IRS in failing to file its
proof of claim in a timely manner. For example, in In re Gregory,245
the court stated that "provided for by the plan" means that plan
must deal with the claim at issue or refer to it. The plan need not
pay the claim or provide a benefit for the claim.246
Disallowed claims, including those claims for priority taxes un-
der § 507(a)(8), are also discharged in a chapter 13 case. This most
often happens where the IRS has failed to timely file a proof of
claim and the claim is disallowed.
There existed a tremendous split of authority on this issue. In
In re Tomlan,247 the court held that an untimely filed proof of claim
is grounds for disallowance of that claim. 248 But is failure to file a
claim in a timely manner a ground for disallowance listed in Bank-
245 705 F.2d 1118 (9thCir. 1983).
246 See In re Leber, 134 B.R. 911 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991)(holding that a tax claim by the
Illinois Department of Revenue which had actual notice of the debtor's chapter 13 case, but
which did not file a proof claim for its prepetition tax claim, was discharged by the chapter 13
plan, despite the contention that the Department was not effectively "provided for" in the
plan); In re Daniel, 107 B.R. 798 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)(holding that the tax claim of the IRS
was "provided for" under the debtor's chapter 13 plan and such claim was therefore dis-
charged upon completion of the plan); In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. Tenn. 1987).
247 103 B.R. 790 (E.D. Wash. 1989), afrd, 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990); see also In re Bor-
der, 116 B.R. 588 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
248 See In re Workman, 108 B.R. 826 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)(holding that the penalty
claim of the IRS against a chapter 13 debtor was a "prepetition" claim in the chapter 13 case
and was barred because the IRS failed to file a timely proof of claim).
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ruptcy Code § 502 as required by § 1328(a)? The Tomlan line of
authority holds yes.249 The opinion in In re Hausladen,250 leads the
contrary line of authority that would hold that tardiness is not a
ground listed under § 502 and, thus, the claim is not dischargeable.
Although I believe that the Hausladen line of authority is right on
the law, because one may quarrel with the meaning of the language
but not with the language itself, I believe that the Tomlan line of
authority states the better policy.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was designed to overrule
Hausladen. In the section-by-section analysis to BRA 1994, Congress
states that an "amendment to section 502(b) is designed to overrule
In re Hausladen... by disallowing claims that are not timely filed."
The only problem is that Congress may not have accomplished its
stated goal. The overruling is supposedly accomplished by a new §
502(b)(9), which adds as a substantive ground for disallowance that
"proof of such claim in not timely filed"-which alone would do
the job-but the amendment goes on to say "except to the extent
tardily filed as permitted under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of
[S]ection 726(a) ...."
The clearest resolution is for priority claims governed by
§ 726(a)(1). The new rule there would allow the tardily filed claim
to share in the first tier of distribution if the claim is filed before
the trustee commences distribution. In that event, Hausladen, and
its progeny in the priority area, such as the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in In re Vecchio,2 1 would be validated, not overruled. The
amemdment does not state, however, what happens to a priority
claim filed after the trustee commences distribution. It cannot be a
first-tier claim, but what is it-third tier under § 726(a)(3), or disal-
lowed entirely under § 502(b)(9)?
For tardily filed, unsecured claims other than priority claims,
the effect of the § 502(b)(9) is ambiguous. While Congress appar-
ently thinks that it intended to disallow such late claims, the
"except" clause muddies the waters. The "except" clause refers to
late filings "permitted" under § 726(a)(3); that section apparently
contemplates distribution in the third tier to "any allowed unse-
249 See In re Border, 116 B.R. 588 (Bankr SD Ohio 1990)(holding that a priority tax claim
of the IRS, for which no proof of claim was filed, would be discharged upon completion of the
debtor's chapter 13 plan even though no funds were distributed to the IRS).
20 146 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).
95 20 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 1994).
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cured claim proof of which is tardily filed" other than ones dealt
with under subsection (2). Subsection (3), along with (2), seemingly
covers all tardily filed claims. If so, then the "except" clause in
§ 502(b)(9) appears to swallow up the disallowance provision and
renders it totally inoperative. The Hausladen problem thus may not
be as dead as Congress thought.
D. Thoughts on Piwority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims: The NBRC
Proposals
Some fifty years ago, Professor MacLaughlin lamented about
the creeping increase in the number of priority claims under the old
Act and the insatiable appetite of the tax collector in bankruptcy.
Rightly so, he made the point that unsecured creditors essentially
pay priority claims and no matter how extensive one made the pri-
ority list, there is always one type of creditor at least as deserving
who did not.
Priority claims are the antithesis to a strong notion in bank-
ruptcy-that similar creditors be treated similarly. Obviously, some
creditors are more equal than others. This inequality of treatment
is not cost free. To the contrary, priority claims reduce the distribu-
tion to general creditors and make it more difficult to reorganize.
Furthermore, to the extent the government insulates itself from the
impact of bankruptcy through the use of priority and nondischarge-
ability treatment for governmental claims, one cannot help but view
bankruptcy as hypocritical if not contemptuous.
One common theme throughout priority claims viz a viz non-
dischargeable claims is that the former usually do not involve
debtor misconduct. It is perceived as unfair to require the general
creditors to pay for debtor misconduct. Thus many of the claims in
§ 523(a) are not priority claims. This should be no different for the
tax collector. Tax claims based on debtor misconduct such as trust
fund liabilities should not receive priority treatment. These claims
may be nondischargeable, but we should revisit their status as prior-
ity claims.
Dischargeability is also going the way of priorities. There are
now some eleven exceptions of debt from discharge. And, like with
priorities, there is always one more type of creditor equally deserv-
ing of this benefit under § 523(a). However, unlike priority claims,
a common thread for nondischargeable claims under § 523(a) is
debtor misconduct. An honest debtor is worthy of the discharge
1997]
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right, a dishonest one is not. Thus, the § 523(a)(1)(B) and (C) tax
claims are consistent with this theme. Although "willfulness" under
§ 523(a)(2)(C) has proved to be a difficult issue, the answer will ul-
timately lie between the criminal fraud definition under I.R.C.
§ 7201 and the more relaxed definition under § 6672. However,
the wholesale incorporation of priority tax claims, including those
that do not involve debtor misconduct, is inconsistent with this
theme. The tax collector's argument to protect current taxes from
discharge is a persuasive one. After all, the argument goes, bank-
ruptcy should not become a new tax haven. The obvious rejoinder,
of course, is why not? In a real sense, bankruptcy is a haven from
debt. Why should taxes be any different? The answer is not self-
evident. We may want to revisit these issues with the thought of at-
tempting to accommodate both the tax collector's and the debtor's
interest.
The Advisory Committee's recommendations and the NBRC
Proposals on dischargeability are modest in nature and in scope.
First, the NBRC has proposed an amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code to provide that the term "assessed or assessment" as used in
§§ 362(b)(9) and 507(a)(8) shall mean "that time at which a taxing
authority may commence an action to collect the tax." Some con-
fusion has surrounded the use of the term "assessment" in the
Bankruptcy Code when used in reference to state and local taxing
authorities. Some taxing authorities have no assessment procedure
whatsoever, some taxes are self-assessed, etc. The purpose of this
Proposal is to provide to the extent possible a universal definition
of assessment, regardless whether conventional "assessment" pro-
cedures are employed. The problem at which this Proposal is ad-
dressed arises only with respect to state or local tax collections.
Thus, any definition of the term "assessment" should be specifi-
cally limited to state and local tax purposes to avoid any confusion
about the meaning of the term for federal purposes. The Proposal
is not meant to define "assessment" in § 1129(a) or to imply that
the event of "assessment" or some other trigger is more or less ap-
propriate under that section.
The NBRC's second Proposal seeks to resolve the issue
whether an income tax return prepared by the taxing authority
should be considered a filed income tax return for purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code. The NBRC has adopted the recommendation of
the Advisory Committee that an income tax return prepared by the
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taxing authority should not be considered a filed income tax return
for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Advisory Committee also entertained and debated several
proposals seeking to reject, modify, or reaffirm the present scope
of the chapter 13 discharge as it relates to tax claims.252 Ultimately,
the Advisory Committee did not reach agreement on any proposal.
The NBRC also failed to reach agreement on any of the proposals,
thus, in effect, voting to retain the scope of the chapter 13 dis-
charge.
Arguments for retention of the chapter 13 discharge are well
documented.25 3 Chapter 13 provides a more robust discharge in
return for greater recovery for creditors then they would have re-
ceived in a chapter 7 case.254 The superdischarge breathes life into
the fundamental bankruptcy policy of providing an individual
debtor a fresh start. 255 The requirements that every plan must be
proposed in good faith 256 and be in the best interests of the credi-
tors257 serve as sufficient gatekeepers to deter bad faith and abuse
of the process. 25 8
Nonetheless, the IRS proposed to conform the discharge of
chapter 13 to that of chapter 7. 259 Essentially, the IRS sought to
eliminate the superdischarge of priority taxes in a chapter 13 case,
and clarify that postpetition taxes for which a proof of claim is filed
under § 1305(a)(1) are not subject to discharge. The Proposal
would align the chapter 13 exceptions to discharge to those of
chapter 7 and an individual under chapter 11.260 The Bankruptcy
Code now discharges a chapter 13 debtor from taxes that are pro-
vided for by the plan or are disallowed under § 502. Several courts
have held that priority taxes mentioned in the plan are "provided
for" and can be discharged whether or not they are actually paid.26 1
252 See TAC Report, supra note 3, at 56-59.
253 See geneally, DAVID G. EPsTEIN E" AL., BANKRUPTCY § 9-20 (1993) (discussing chapter
13 dLharge).
254 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(4) (1994).
255 See EPSTEIN, supr= note 253, § 9-20.
256 See I1 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(3).
257 See id. § 1325 (a)(4).
258 See IRS Submission to NBRC at 27 (on file with author).
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 See, e.g., In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Goodwin, 58 B.R. 75
(Bankr. D. Me. 1986).
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Similarly, clahns for priority taxes that have been disallowed in the
bankruptcy cases under § 502 and would not be dischargeable in a
chapter 7 or 11 case have been held to be dischargeable because
they were provided for in a chapter 13 plan.262 The problem most
often arises in those cases where the IRS's claim was untimely filed
or where the IRS failed to file a claim at all. 263 The most serious
concern of the IRS occurs with derivative liabilities, such as the trust
fund recovery penalty,264 where the debt is prepetition but the de-
termination of liability does not occur until after the bar date. 265
Additionally, under present law a chapter 13 debtor may obtain a
discharge for taxes fraudulently underreported or evaded more
than 3 years ago. Certain tax penalties can also be discharged un-
der chapter 13, although those same taxes and penalties would not
be dischargeable for individuals in a chapter 7 or 11 case.266
Short of the IRS Proposal, I proposed a modest modification
to the superdischarge of chapter 13-amend 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) to
deny a discharge to those chapter 13 debtors who have filed fraudu-
lent returns26 7 or who have engaged in an affirmative act or acts in
an attempt to willfully and fraudulently evade a tax 26 8 where the
governmental unit proves in accordance with applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law the fraudulent conduct in the bankruptcy case. Evidence
suggests that taxing authorities receive a greater recovery in chapter
13 cases than they do in chapter 7 cases. In fact, the Bankruptcy
Code recognizes this consequence in chapter 13 cases and provides
incentives for individual debtors to seek relief under chapter 13.269
These incentives include relief from postpetition interest on prior-
ity tax claims,270 an expanded scope of the automatic stay,271 and a
262 See EPSTEIN, supra note 253, § 9-20, at 723.
263 See In re Border, 116 B.R. 588 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (unfiled claim discharged); In
re Tomlan, 102 B.R. 790 (E.D. Wash. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990) (untimely claim
disallowed, then discharged); In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (prepetition tax
claims assessed postpetition were discharged because no claim filed).
264 See I.R.C. § 6672 (1988).
265 The "bar date" is the deadline by which a proof of claim must be filed to be timely.
266 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1) and (a) (7) (1994).
267 See id. § 523(a)(1)(B).
268 See id. § 523(a)(1)(C).
269 See, e.g., id. § 1328(a).
270 See Jack F. Williams, Canning the aapter 13 Super Discharge, 4 AM. BANHR. INST. L.
REV. 553-54 (1996).
271 See 11 U.S.C. § 1301.
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broader discharge. 272 These incentives for filing under chapter 13
as opposed to chapter 7 should be continued. Thus, a broader
scope of discharge is justified under chapter 13.
At the same time, however, the chapter 13 process should not
result in a haven from tax liabilities for those taxpayers who have
defrauded a governmental authority. Although the requirement
that any chapter 13 plan must be proposed in good faith may oper-
ate as a gate to prevent abuses of the bankruptcy process by tax pro-
testors and defrauders, 273 courts are not in agreement on the mean-
ing of good faith in these circumstances and present law lacks
clarity. 274 Thus, a specific amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) is
necessary to except from the scope of the chapter 13 discharge tax
claims with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or
with respect to which the debtor engaged in an affirmative act or
acts to willfully and fraudulently evade a tax where the governmen-
tal unit proves in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law the
fraudulent conduct in the bankruptcy case.
Interestingly, four votes were cast by members of the Advisory
Committee in favor of this modest Proposal to limit chapter 13 dis-
charges. Even more fascinating is the fact that those representatives
from the federal government voted against the Proposal-obviously
embracing an all or nothing stance. Big mistake. Adding the two
votes held by the federal representatives to the four would have
forged a majority in favor of modest modification to the chapter 13
discharge. Some NBRC Commissioners used the lack of majority
vote to support inaction on their part-again, I believe, a big politi-
cal mistake.
The chapter 13 discharge is the albatross around the neck of
the NBRC. Who can justify expanded debt relief for a debtor who
has filed fraudulent returns! Rejection by the NBRC of any modi-
fication to the chapter 13 discharge where a debtor files fraudulent
returns or willfully attempts to evade or defeat a tax 2'75 will return
to haunt NBRC efforts at meaningful bankruptcy reform.
272 See id. § 1328(a).
273 See id. § 1328(a)(3); see also Williams, supra note 270, at 553-54.
274 See, EPSTEIN, supra note 253, § 9-20.
275 A strong concern of opponents to a reduction in the scope of the chapter 13 discharge
is what is precisely meant by a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax. Track No. 602 should
address this point. SeeTAC Report, supra note 3, at 116-17.
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CONCLUSION
Historically, tax issues in bankruptcy get short-shrift. Much of
the debate has been fettered by slogans designed to truncate de-
bate. That was not the case with the NBRC and the Advisory Com-
mittee. Careful and thoughtful debate-although, at times, quite
impassioned-was the rule. All parties focused on achieving con-
sensus without sacrificing what was most important to them. The
fruits of the efforts should be given careful consideration. While I
may disagree with some of the specific tax proposals of the Advi-
sory Committee and the NBRC, I am proud of the process and of
those professionals who put much of their differences aside and got
the work done. Their efforts should be applauded.
